The University of Chicago
FOUNDED BY JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER

DEC 18 1907

STUDIES IN GREEK ALLEGORICAL INTERPRETATION

I. SKETCH OF ALLEGORICAL INTERPRETATION BEFORE PLUTARCH.
II. PLUTARCH.

A DISSERTATION

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ARTS AND LITERATURE, IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

(DEPARTMENT OF GREEK)

BY
ANNE BATES HERSMAN

CHICAGO
THE BLUE SKY PRESS
1906

3781
C53H

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

The University of Chicago
FOUNDED BY JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER

STUDIES IN GREEK ALLEGORICAL INTERPRETATION

I. SKETCH OF ALLEGORICAL INTERPRETATION BEFORE PLUTARCH.
II. PLUTARCH.

A DISSERTATION

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ARTS AND LITERATURE, IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

(DEPARTMENT OF GREEK)

BY
ANNE BATES HERSMAN



CHICAGO
THE BLUE SKY PRESS
1906

141243

LIBRARY
LELAND STANFORD JUNIOR
UNIVERSITY

PREFACE.

Part I of this study is not an exhaustive treatment of allegorical interpretation in Greek literature before the end of the first century of our era. It is an attempt to show the motives of such interpretation, its beginnings and various developments, together with comment on some other results of that spirit of criticism out of which grew allegoristic. Part II is an account of the religious beliefs of Plutarch, the foremost Greek writer of his age, and of what he thought of religious tradition and its relation to philosophical thought and moral conduct.

I wish to express my indebtedness to Professor Shorey of the University of Chicago, who has from time to time read my manuscript and given me helpful suggestions and criticisms. The subsubject itself grew out of a larger one suggested by him, namely Plutarch's literary criticism. To his aid and criticism the dissertation owes any value that it may possess. My obligation to Professor Breasted is expressed on page 62 f. n.

"La Critique des Traditions Religieuses chez les Grecs," by P. Decharme, came into my hands only after this paper had been sent to the printer. Much of the book would have been useful for comparison, particularly the following pages: The preface, on the attitude of the Greeks towards their religion; cf. below p. 1 foll. Page X, on allegorists, and XII., some interpreters held that the myth-makers were in possession of a broad science; cf. below Zeno and Plutarch. Page 10 foll., some parts of Hesiod's Theogony are conscious allegory. Page 119, the images of Democritus were real beings, but, page 457, not demons in the sense in which Xenocrates and later writers used this term; cf. below p. 14. Page 240 foll., Aristotle's attitude towards myths was that of an allegorist; cf. below p. 8 f. n. 11 and pp. 9, 10. Page 270 foll., a history of allegorical interpretation before the Stoics. Page 283, Metrodorus allegorized the heroes; Decharme refers to Tatian and Hesychius, but does not mention the fragment of the Herculanean Rolls; he neglects the ἑρεῖτε in the Tatian passage; cf. below p. 11 foll. Page 289, there is not enough left of the work of Antisthenes to justify a statement of his method of interpreting the poets; the fragments in the scholia on the Odyssey are not allegorical; cf. below p. 16. Page 305 foll., Stoic exegesis. Page 370 foll., Euhemerism. Page 414 foll., especially page 426 foll., religious views of Plutarch. Page 465 foll., Plutarch's interpretation of sacred tradition. Page 477, on Plutarch's rejection of Stoic allegoristic; cf. below pp. 37, 52.

ANNE BATES HERSMAN.

June, 1905, Chicago.

This dissertation was in the printer's hands in June, 1905. The publication has been delayed nearly a year on account of accidents and misfortunes in the printing press. A. B. H.

May, 1906.

PARTIAL LIST OF WORKS CONSULTED.

The following modern authorities have been particularly helpful. They will be quoted merely by the name. References to Zeller without the name of the work will be to his History of Greek Philosophy. Other authorities will be referred to in the footnotes:

Grote, History of Greece, I. c. 16.

Zeller, Gesch. Gr. Phil., under special names or schools. IV. 322 f. n. 1, a short account of the rise and causes of allegoristic, and motives of its exponents.

Sengebusch, Hom. Dis. I.

Wolff, Prolegomena, especially 161.

Gruppe, Gr. Culte u. Mythen I. 14 foll. 24 foll., Stoic allegoristic; especially as it appears in Heraclitus and Cornutus. 28, 29, a summing up of the unsatisfactory accomplishment of allegorical interpretation. Cf. Lobeck II. 1050 foll.

Hirzel, Untersuch. z Cic. Phil. Schr.

Krische, Forschungen. Die Theol. Lehr. d. Gr. Denker I.

Schrader, Porph. Quaest. Hom. II. Proleg. c. 3, parts II and III.

Schow, introduction in his edition of Heraclitus Alleg. Hom.

Lobeck, Aglaophamus I. Especially 155 foll.

Schlemm. De font. Plut. com. de aud. po. 32 foll.

Heinze, Xenokrates.

Lehrs. Aristarchus III. c. 4, p. 201 foll.

Jebb, Introduction to Homer 80, 89.

Stallbaum, on Plato, Ion. 530 D.

Amoneit, De Plut. Stud. Hom. 15, foll.

Christ, Gesch. d. Gr. Lit. 63.

Pearson, Fragments of Zeno and Cleanthes.

Arnim, Stoic. Vet. Fr II.

Diels, Fr. d. Vorsokratiker.

Zeller, Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics, translated by Reichel p. 354 foll.

Siegfried, Philo von Alex. P. 9 foll. on the Stoics; 160 foll. on Philo.

Bernays, Phil. Unzers. d. Weltalls, 30 foll.

Wyttenbach, notes on de aud. po. and on de Is. in his edition of Plut. Mor.

Volkmann, Plutarch.

Oakesmith, The Religion of Plutarch.

Parthey, Introduction and Notes in his edition of de Is.

Erman, Life in Ancient Egypt, translated by Tirard.

Lafaye, Les divinités d'Alex. hors de l'Égypte.

CONTENTS.

PART I. Historical Sketch 7-23

Introduction 7-10

Plato 8
Xenophon 9
Aristotle 9

Early Homeric Allegorists 10-13

Theagenes 10
Heracliteans 10
Followers of Thales 10
Anaxagoras 11
Metrodorus 11
Stesimbrotus 12
Glaucon (Glaucus) 12
Anaximander 13

Other Writers 13-16

Euripides 13
Critias 13
Democritus 13
Prodicus 14
Euhemerus 15
Palaephatus 15
Polybius 15
Diodorus 15
Agroetas 15
Theophrastus 15
Herodorus 15
Hecataeus 15
Ephorus 16
Herodotus 16

Cynics 16, 17

Antisthenes 16
Diogenes 17

Stoics 17-22

Zeno 19
Cleanthes 20
Chrysippus 20
Heraclitus 21
Cornutus 21
Philo 22

Grammarians 23

Aristarchus 23
Crates 23

PART II. Plutarch 25-64

Introduction 25-32

Religious views 25
Attitude towards tradition 26
Attitude towards poetry 26-29
Attitude towards myths 29-31
Euhemerism 31
Demons 31
Attitude towards rites 31

Allegorical Interpretation 32-57

Principles 32-33
Egyptian myth not naive 33
Plutarch not a rationalist 34
Sometimes historical 34
Figurative use of words 36
Right use of metaphor 38

The Isis Myth 38-56

Osiris the moist 40-45
Two opposed world principles 45
Metaphysical 46-56
Physical 51, 52
Animal worship 53
Images of the gods 54
Osiris lord of Hades 56

APPENDIX I. Numbers 59, 60

APPENDIX II. 61-64

Isis myth 61
Plutarch on hieroglyphics 62
Plutarch on Egyptian etymologies 63
Authorities named by Plutarch 63, 64

PART I. HISTORICAL SKETCH.

In their moral and mental development[1] the Greeks came to a point when their traditional religion and history no longer satisfied them. They must either renounce or modify their beliefs. Xenophanes[2] boldly pronounced Homer and Hesiod immoral and unworthy of belief. Pindar[3] rejected particular stories that offended his ideas of the gods. Others still maintained the truth of the myths, but conceived some hidden meaning intended by the original makers. They seem sometimes to have thought that the meaning was not intentionally obscured, but had been later misunderstood[4]; at other times they described the myth-makers as concealing the true doctrine under symbols and enigmas. There were speculations about the origin of all religious beliefs, or about the origin of particular traditions or observances.[5]

Allegorical interpretation became an intellectual and moral necessity, either to preserve one's own faith, or to account for the faith of others. However, all figurative use of the names of the gods must not be considered as allegorical.[7] When Empedocles called by the title Aphrodite the force that draws together unlike elements and so creates a complex world, he did not himself believe that the god worshipped under that name was only a vivid representation of a force; nor did he mean to imply that poets and myth-makers had known his scheme of the universe, and had described Aphrodite and established her worship as a riddle of the truth. There were points in common between the god and the thing over which he presided; the philosopher recognized the likeness by a metaphorical transference of the name. This is allegory, not alle-

[1] For a discussion of the attitude of the Greeks themselves to their own tradition, and of the causes of change in attitude, see Grote, I. ch. 16. For a short history of allegorical interpretation, Zeller III. 322 f. n. 1.

[2] Diog. L. IX. 18 and II. 46. Sextus Math. IX. 193 and I. 224.

[3] Olymp. 1, 52 foll.; ib. 36 foll.; see Croiset, La Poésie de Pindare, 185, 186.

[4] This was the teaching of Euhemerus; and Plutarch considered it possible in some cases, see below p. 26, 35 foll.; although he rejected Euhemerism.

[5] See below Democritus, p. 13; Prodicus, p. 14; Critias, p. 13.

[6] See below Herodotus, p. 24; Hecataeus, 24.

[7] On the use of a name for a thing, not ἀλληγορικῶς but μεταληπτικῶς, see Heraclitus, Alleg. Hom. ch. 26.

[8] Nor did Lucretius use such interpretation of popular religion when he invoked Venus as god of creation and life.

gorical interpretation.[9] Nor is vague poetic pantheism allegorical interpretation; such, for example, as the fragment of Aeschylus,[10] "Zeus is the ether, Zeus is the earth, is the heavens; Zeus, indeed, is all, and is whatever is above these."

Plato[11] refused to admit into his State the impious stories found in the poets *οὔτ' ἐν ὑπονοίαις πεποιημένας οὔτε ἄνευ ὑπονοιῶν*, for the reason that the young man would be unable to judge what was said figuratively and what was not.[12] He particularly objected to the idea that Homer was all-wise,[13] and argued that neither Homer nor Hesiod seemed to have been a teacher, and guide to a better life.[14] It is true that when he was not describing the ideal conditions of a perfect state, when, that is, he had to acknowledge the presence and influence of the poets, he did force the meaning to suit his own ends, and for just the same reason that the Stoics alleged, because Simonides "is divine and wise";[15] although in these cases the interpretation is not allegorical, his justification is that of the allegorists, *ἠνίξατο ἄρα.....ὡς ἔοικεν, ὁ Σιμωνίδης ποιητικῶς.*[16] In the Phaedrus[17] Socrates quotes an allegorical interpretation of the story of Boreas and Orithyia, but adds that for his part he has not time for such studies. The Cratylus has many allegorical etymologies,[18] but Plato was here rather belittling allegoristic by ridiculing these etymologies that were one of its chief aids; for Socrates undertook the search into the origin of names on condition that the investigation should be for amusement and not entirely serious.[19]

[9] Both Ker, The Dark Ages 28 (in the series Periods of European Literature) and his reviewer in *The Nation* (New York) for May 11, 1905, p. 382, use allegory indiscriminately for the two ideas; and the confusion seems to extend beyond the term even to the ideas themselves.

[10] Clem. Alex. Strom. V. 718 P (ch. 14, Sec. 114 end).

[11] Plato and Xenophon and Aristotle are put here instead of in their chronological order because they do not belong to the number of allegorical interpreters, and appear at all only on account of their testimony that this method was much used at their time. Cf. Ar. Clouds, 264, a physical interpretation of Zeus is ridiculed.

[12] Rep. 378 D. Cf. Duemmler, Ant. 24, "Allegoricam interpretandi rationem Plato neque ignorat neque refellit sed suo iure putat abiciendam. Rep. 378 D." On Plato's banishment of the poets see Bohne, Wie gelaengt Plato z. Aufstell. s. Staatsideals. u. wie erklaert sich s. Urtheil u. d. Poesie in demselben?

[13] Rep. 598 C, D; 606 E; 607 A. On the relation of the Alexandrine school to Plato see Sengebusch 118 foll. That school, too, did not use allegoristic, and rejected the omniscience of Homer. On Plutarch's rejection of the same idea, see below p. 26 foll.

[14] Rep. 600.

[15] Rep. 331 E. Cf. Protagoras 344-347, a forced interpretation of another poem of Simonides.

[16] Rep. 332 B. On Plato's use of *αἰνιττομαι* to extract edifying meaning from the poets and others, cf. Lysis 214 D, Charm. 162 A, Theaet. 152 C, and 194 C.

[17] 229 C, foll.

[18] For example, 407A, B, the contemporary interpreters of Homer derive Athena from *ἀ θεονόη*.

[19] 406 C. And he is parodying the extreme Heracliteans by the explanation in Theaet. 153 C of Homer's golden chain (Il. 8, 17. Cf. Heraclitus, alleg. Hom. ch. 36) as the sun; and 194 C that Homer called the heart *κεάρ—αἰνιττόμενος τὴν τοῦ κηροῦ ὁμοιότητα*, is not very serious. Cf. etymologies

In two ways Plato supplied an impetus to the well-defined movement in the direction of allegorical interpretation. By his arraignment of Homer and Hesiod as teachers of impious beliefs and immoral ideas he roused up others to the defense of the traditional religion. Heraclitus in the Allegoriae Homericae mentions Plato four times with great bitterness.[20] Although his own use of allegorical etymologies was jesting, they doubtless became a model for serious attempts to trace the origin of things by means of their names.[21] Probably in a third way, also, Plato influenced later criticism in the direction of an allegorical understanding of the poets. His doctrine of the "enthusiasmus"[22] of poets might well have suggested to his readers the infallibility of inspired writings, an idea not accepted by Plato, as we have just seen. He did himself believe that poetic creation was the result of a peculiar state of mind, of an overheated imagination, a condition inexplicable in logical terms. But in the Ion at least he was ironical, and that irony was, in all likelihood, missed by literal-minded readers; as the jesting spirit of the Cratylus was missed; and they missed, too, Plato's[23] insistence on the necessity of inspiration in the interpreters themselves.

Xenophon also testified to the common habit of looking for a hidden meaning in the poets; for in the Symposium[24] he made Socrates say that rhapsodes were the stupidest set of men because they did not understand τὰς ὑπονοίας. When Socrates[25] said that Circe feasted men upon delicacies, Xenophon uses the word ἐπισκώπτων, and adds ἔπαιζεν ἅμα σπουδάζων, for of course the moral was serious, however playful Socrates may have been in the allegorical interpretation.

Aristotle was not hostile to the allegorists. He sometimes treated the early poets as in a sense natural philosophers; for instance, in Hesiod's Chaos and Eros he found an anticipation of his own doctrine of material and efficient causes. It is true that

in Gorgias 493 A, where the verb μυθολογέω seems to be used in the sense of writing an allegory. Cf. below p. 30. That Plato did not use allegorical interpretation seriously, see Wolff 164; Gruppe, I. 14 f. n. 18; Hirzel Unt. z. Cic. Phil. Schrift. I. 221. On Socrates, Krische I. 234. Ker, The Dark Ages, 29, in the series Periods of European Literature, makes the remarkable mistake of calling Plato an allegorist; he claims that the philosopher in his treatment of Homer had a familiarity with the "Gothic" commonplaces of allegorical interpretation.

[20] Ch. 4, 12, 17, 21. On Plato as the cause of much allegoristic, see Schrader II. Proleg. 389; Sengebusch I. 118 foll.; Schow 223. 224.

[21] See Krische 399 on the Stoic indebtedness to the Cratylus.

[22] Apol. 22 B, C. Phaedrus 245 A, B. Ion 533 D foll. Cf. Bernard Shaw, The Perfect Wagnerite, 121. The artist not, as Plato ironically said, able to understand what he has never learned, but to write what he does not understand. This modern conception of the rights of the interpreter surpasses anything developed by the ancients.

[23] Ion, l. c. Cf. Prot. 347 E; Hipp. Min. 365 D.

[24] 3, 6. Duemmler, Antisthenica, 29, has given this passage as if Antisthenes had uttered these words.

[25] Mem. 1, 3, 7. Cf. Pal. Anthol. 10, 50, Circe allegorized as a prostitute. The use of the Sirens in 2, 6, 11, foll. is by way of comparison, not allegorical.

this is not allegorical interpretation of a naive myth, for Hesiod was consciously using Chaos and Eros as representative of large natural forces.[26] Aristotle did believe that the myth-makers intentionally hid truths under figurative forms, "for the persuasion of the multitude[27] and for the aid of the laws."[28] Though he went on to say that probably art and philosophy were often found and lost.[29]

It is possible to do little more than give a list of the earliest allegorists. In the absence of their writings or of detailed reports of their teachings, the nature of their interpretation can only be conjectured from later developments of the same tendencies. Theagenes of Rhegium heads the list. He is not only the earliest mentioned, but is said to have been the first who wrote about Homer.[30] The Homeric scholium gives two methods of explaining the battle of the gods, that the names of the gods were applied to the departments of the physical world and also that they were applied to mental qualities; then adds, "Such was the ancient method of defense, a method that came from Theagenes of Rhegium."[31]

There seems to be no proof that Haraclitus[32] himself used Homer allegorically, but certainly his followers did so, unless, indeed, Plato was showing them how they might add authority to their doctrines when he made Homer[33] the first to teach that nothing stands, that all is in constant motion. He used as proof of this theory the verse Il. 14, 201 and 302, "Oceanus, the father of the gods and their mother Tethys." Again he called the Heracliteans Homerids,[34] "on account of the doctrine of constant motion," as the scholium says,[35] quoting this verse of Homer.

This same verse has, perhaps more naturally, been quoted to show that Homer believed water the original element.[36] It is not

[26] Met. I. 984b lines 23 foll. See Zeller 3, 795, especially f. n. 3.

[27] Cf. below Philo p. 22.

[28] Met. XI. 1074 b lines I foll. Cf. below p. 13, Critias.

[29] Aristotle, Fragment 175 (Rose) is a physical explanation of Od. 12. 129 (Dindorf's Schol. and Eustathius, Od. 1717, 33). But Schrader II. 423, argues that it does not belong to Aristotle. Sengebusch refers to it as genuine. For another scholium, with the words ἀλληγορικῶς---Ὅμηρον ascribed to Aristotle (Eustathius, Od. 1713. 9) see Schrader 419 f. n. l. Still a third, on Hes. Theog. 275, is so unlike Aristotle that Flach, Int. to Gloss. u. Schol. Hes. Theog. 161, thinks a sentence may have fallen out between the interpretation and the name.

[30] Schol. Il. 20, 67 (Dindorf IV. 231).

[31] Gruppe, I. 21 f. n. 37, suspects that later writers took as allegorizing the merely metaphorical expressions of Theagenes and Metrodorus, such as are found in Empedocles and Heraclitus. That the two latter are not called allegorists weakens the force of this suggestion.

[32] Schuster, Heraklit von Ephesos, s. 53 f.. however, calls Heraclitus the chief of allegorists; quoted by Zeller, IV. 322 f. n. l., and Gruppe I. 21, neither of whom agrees with Schuster.

[33] Theaet. 152 E.

[34] Theaet. 179 E. Cf. 180 D; Crat. 402 A foll.; in Crat. 402 B, they go back to Orpheus for their doctrine.

[35] Plato, Firmin-Didot III. 285 on Theaet. 138 F-D line 19.

[36] Arist. Met. 983 b 27. The indefiniteness of these statements, there are some who think, etc., would seem to exclude Thales. Plut. de Is. 364 D (the Egyptians) think that Homer as well as Thales learnt from them, etc. Cf. Ps. Plut. Plac. Phil. 875 F, with reference to Il. 14, 246.

reported that Thales made this claim; therefore, it seems probable that he did not do so, or at least that no such tradition was handed down.

Anaxagoras was the first to explain the Homeric poems as discussions of virtue and justice.[37] In this expression Favorinus probably considered the method of Anaxagoras as more distinctly ethical than that of Theagenes of Rhegium; or, possibly, "first" is used carelessly.[38] "The Anaxagoreans explained the mythical gods so as to make Zeus mind, Athena technical skill."[39]

Anaxagoras was the first to publish a book on physical allegory, but he was preceded in this method by Metrodorus of Lampsacus, who also followed Anaxagoras in the moral interpretation.[40] Metrodorus went beyond the usual allegorical interpretation which confined itself to the gods, and called Agamemnon air, if Hesychius (s. v.) is to be trusted. There is a fragment of the Herculanean Rolls that identifies the heroes of the Iliad with physical phenomena, and some of the gods with parts of the human body. Gomperz[41] recognizes Philodemus as the author of this fragment, and, from its likeness to the reference in Hesychius, assumes that it gives the opinion of Metrodorus. He refers to the fragment as, p. 12, "den Metrodorus von Lampsakos betreffende Mittheilung." On p. 14 he says: "Die klarere Einsicht, die wir nunmehr in das allegorische System des Metrodorus von Lampsakos, des Schuelers des Anaxagoras, gewinnen mittelst des f. 90, welches sich—mit Ausnahme der ersten Zeile—vollstaendig und mit Leichtigkeit herstellen laesst: καὶ περ (ὶ) νόμ (ων) κα (ὶ ἐ) θισ (μ) ῶν τῶ (ν) πα (ρ') ἀν (θρώ) πο (ις)· καὶ τὸν Ἀ (να) μέμνονα μὲν αἰθέρα εἶναι (cf. Hesych.)

[37] Favorinus, in Diog. L. II. 11. Sandys, A Hist of Class. Schol, p. 30. and Egger, Hist. de la Crit. chez les Grecs, p. 99, say that Anaxagoras saw in the arrows of Apollo the rays of the sun. Egger refers to Tzetzes on the Iliad. p 94 ed. God. Hermann. Decharme, La Crit. d. Trad. Rel. chez les Grecs, thinks that the Tzetzes passage will not bear this interpretation. Sandys, l. c., Anaxagoras "is said (whether truly or not) to have found in the web of Penelope an emblem of the rules of dialectics, the warp being the premises, the woof the conclusion, and the flame of the torches, by which she executed her task, being none other than the light of reason," with a reference to Schol. on Od. 2, 104. The writer seems to have been misled by a remark of Egger's, p. 100 f. n. 1, to the effect that the author of this anonymous scholium evidently follows the method of Anaxagoras, "s'il n'est pas Anaxagore lui-meme." The syllogism was not known before Aristotle.

[38] Modern writers use "first" about various allegorists. On Duemmler's claim for Antisthenes see below p. 17, f. n. 72. Gomperz, Gr. Thinkers (Trans. by Magnus), I. 375, Diogenes of Apollonia "was the first to break ground in introducing the allegorical method in national poetry." But on page 379, "Already in the sixth century, Theagenes of Rhegium had applied the panacea of allegory to the authority of Homer, which Xenophanes had assailed so bitterly."

[39] Zeller I. 1019 f. n. 3 quoted from Syncellus, Chron. s. 149 C. Zeller thinks it probable that it was not Anaxagoras but his pupils that used moral interpretation; for his interests were physical, and from this passage of Syncellus it seems that his followers did turn to psychological interpretation. On Anaxagoras see Lobeck, I. 157 foll.

[40] Diog. L. II, 11. See Tatian C. Graec. c. 21, for the physical side of the interpretation.

[41] Sitz. Ber. d. Kais. Akad. Wien. 116, pp. 12-14.

Ἀγαμέμνονα τὸν αἰθέρα Μητρόδωρος ἀλληγορικῶς), τὸν (Ἀ)χιλλέα δ' ἥλιον, τὴν Ἑλέ(ν)ην δὲ γῆν καὶ τὸν Ἀλέ(ξα) νδρον ἀέρα, τὸν Ἕκτο(ρα) δὲ σελήνην, καὶ τοὺς ἄλ(λου)ς ἀναλόγως ὠνόμασ(ται) τούτοις. τῶν δὲ θεῶν (τὴν) Δήμητρα μὲν ἥπ(αρ τὸν Διό)νυσον δὲ σπλῆ(να, τὸν Ἀ)πόλλω[ι] δὲ χολή(ν).

So sehen wir denn, dass dieser antike Vorlaeufer unserer modernen Uschold und Forchhammer es an systematischer Folgerichtigkeit keineswegs fehlen liess, und dass ihn was immer sich auch gegen seine Methode einwenden lassen mag, der Vorwurf der Inconsequenz, den man in einen Bemerkung Tatians zu finden geglaubt hat, jedenfalls nicht mit Recht treffen wuerde (adv. Graec., c. 37 [this must be a misprint for 21] vgl. Grote. History I[2] 563, Zeller's Philosophie der Griechen I[3], 831)." The passage of Titian is as follows:

καὶ Μητρόδωρος δὲ ὁ Λαμψακηνὸς ἐν τῷ Περὶ Ὁμήρου λίαν εὐήθως διείλεκται, πάντα εἰς ἀλληγορίαν μετάγων. οὔτε γὰρ Ἥραν οὔτε Ἀθηνᾶν οὔτε Δία τοῦτ' εἶναί φησιν ὅπερ οἱ τοὺς περιβόλους αὐτοῖς καὶ τεμένη καθιδρύσαντες νομίζουσιν, φύσεως δὲ ὑποστάσεις καὶ στοιχείων διακοσμήσεις. καὶ τὸν Ἕκτορα δὲ καὶ τὸν Ἀχιλλέα δηλαδὴ καὶ τὸν Ἀγαμέμνονα καὶ πάντας ἁπαξαπλῶς Ἕλληνάς τε καὶ βαρβάρους σὺν τῇ Ἑλένῃ καὶ τῷ Πάριδι τῆς αὐτῆς φύσεως ὑπάρχοντας χάριν οἰκονομίας ἐρεῖτε παρεισῆχθαι οὐδενὸς ὄντος τῶν προειρημένων ἀνθρώπων.

Relying upon this passage, Grote I, 374, and Schlemm (de Font. Plut. Com. de aud. po. et fort. 32 f. n. 1), say that Metrodorus gave physical explanations of the heroes. They seem to have overlooked *ἐρεῖτε*. Zeller gives the *ἐρεῖτε* due weight, I. 1019, f. n. 4. It would almost seem that Lobeck, I. 156, f. n. (b), had before him a different text, for, while he evidently does not think that Tatian had borne witness to Metrodorus's allegorizing any hero but Agamemnon, he says that Metrodorus considered the other heroes as introduced *χάριν οἰκονομίας*. Now in our text this is not the statement of Metrodorus, but of the supposed objector implied in *ἐρεῖτε*, for the *χάριν οἰκονομίας* is dependent upon the *ἐρεῖτε παρεισῆχθαι* as well as the names of the heroes. To allegorize the heroes[42] was not the custom of even the Stoics, and had not the same excuse that operated in the case of the gods, namely, to avoid impiety. Therefore, it seems probable that Tatian gives the correct tradition, and that Hesychius and the author of this fragment neglected the *ἐρεῖτε*, or rather whatever in Tatian's source the *ἐρεῖτε* represents, just as Grote and Schlemm have done.

Plato[43] joins the names of Stesimbrotus and Glaucon to that of

[42a] Cf. on this use of *οἰκονομίας χάριν* Max. Tyr. 32, 9, *δι' οἰκονομίας ἡρωϊκῆς*. The whole chapter is an allegorical interpretation of Homer as a teacher of ethics and politics.

[42] It is true a late writer does allegorize Paris in the Apple of Discord story. He is perception by means of the senses, Sallustius, Phil. de diis c. 4.

[43] Ion, 530 D.

Metrodorus as interpreters of Homer, but does not give their methods. Xenophon,[44] however, reports Stesimbrotus and Anaximander as explaining the *ὑπονοίας* of Homer.

As a tragic poet Euripides was obliged to use the myths in their essential forms. However, he was so frankly rationalistic that the few allegorical interpretations found in his works may be regarded as suggestive of his own beliefs, and not merely as indications of the somewhat common feelings of the time. In two fragments he distinctly calls Zeus ether.[45] In the mouth of another poet this might be the deification of this great and impressive and mysterious part of nature, a deification consonant with popular feeling and usage. More necessarily allegoristic are some expressions of psychological interpretation of the gods; as "Zeus, whether the laws of nature or the mind of mortals."[46] When Orestes cries out to the Eumenides, Electra bids him lie quiet, for he sees none of those things that he thinks he clearly recognizes.[47] Mortals called their love-folly Aphrodite.[48] Tiresias saves his piety and the dignity of Zeus at once by explaining that the story that Dionysus was sewn up in the thigh, *μηρός*, of Zeus was a popular misunderstanding of what really did take place: Zeus had saved Dionysus, and had given Hera a wraith in the image of a baby as a pledge, *ὅμηρος*.[49]

There are some verses quoted by Sextus Math. 9.54, as from Critias, by Ps. Plut. Plac. 880 E as from Euripides, that make religion only a clever device of law givers, invented to restrain men from lawless acts, even when they think that they are safe from human observation.[50]

Democritus, Prodicus, and Euhemerus seem rather to have sought the sources[51] of belief in the popular religion than to have

[44] Symp. 3. 6. Lobeck I, 157, "Fulgentius XIV. 604 said that Anaximander Lampsacenus and Xenophanes Heracleopolites explained physically the myths of the muses." On Anaximander see Sengebusch 207. On Glaucon, 208; on all these names see Lobeck I. 156, 157. Plato, Crat, 407 A, "Those of the present day who are learned in Homer" explain that Homer represented mind and judgment under the name Athena; several etymologies follow.

[45] Frag. 869 and 935 Nauck. Cf. Cornutus, de nat. deor. c. 20.

[46] Troad. 886. Cf. Cic. Tuscul. I. 26, 65.

[47] Orestes 255-259. Cf. 314. On the treatment of the Eumenides see Decharme, Euripides, p. 68, and Girard, Le Sent. Rel. en Grèce, 401-404. Cf. Cornutus N. D. 10, the dreadful appearance of the Eumenides was due to the imagination of the wicked.

[48] Troad 983-992, Cf. below Antisthenes, p. 16.

[49] Bac. 286-297. Dion. Hal. Ars. Rhet. 300-356 (Rieske), the Melanippe of Euripides had argued against *τέρατα*. Bac. 284 is probably a poetic identification of wine and the wine god. See Decharme, Euripides, p. 59 foll. Nestle, Euripides, p. 80 foll. Zeller, II. 13, 14. Duemmler, Akademiker, 142-144.

[50] Plato in Laws 889 E. foll. objects to the idea that the gods exist merely by convention. Cf. Cic. N. D. I. 42, 118. See Zeller I. 1132 foll.

[51] On sources of belief in gods, see Sextus Emp. Math. 9, 14, foll. Plutarch Amat. 763 C; de Is. 369 B; see below p. 26. Ps. Plut. Plac. Phil. 879 F. Dio. Chrys. XII. 391R. foll. Schol. Il. 20, 67 (Dindorf IV. 230 foll.); Eustathius 3. Syncellus, first part of Chronika. Anon. Alleg. (Westermann)

endeavored to preserve and support their own belief, or to defend the myth-makers against the accusation of immorality. According to Democritus, one origin of the belief in gods was the effort men made to assign causes to striking natural phenomena.[52] But he seemed to believe in some more direct manifestations of supernatural beings, for he described images that appear to men as beings more powerful than themselves, larger and longer-lived, some good and some evil; they were also prophetic of the future; when men saw these images, they called them gods.[53] Democritus spoke of Zeus as "what men now call air."[54] And he gave an allegorical explanation of the epithet *τριτογένεια*. It means that wisdom has three parts, to reason well, to speak eloquently one's thought, and to put properly into practice what has been thought out.[55]

"Prodicus the Cean says that the ancients believed sun and moon and rivers and springs, and, in general, all things that are beneficial to man to be gods on account of their service to us, as the Egyptians look on the Nile. And that on this account bread was believed to be Demeter, wine Dionysus, water Poseidon, fire Hephaestos, and, indeed, each of the aids to man's life was treated in this way,"[56] that is, deified. Cicero,[57] too, understood Prodicus to deny the existence of gods, that is, wholly to allegorize the tradi-

Script. Poet. Hist. Gr. P. 327. 4; 328. 22. Cic. N. D. III. 7. 16; better, II. 5. 13-15, on Cleanthes's views. Only Democritus, Prodicus and Euhemerus are spoken of here, for their views seem akin to allegoristic.

[52] Sextus Math. 9. 24.

[53] Sextus Math. 9. 19. Cf. Cic. N. D. I. 12. 29; 43. 120. Cicero says that besides these images Democritus sometimes called the mind of man god. Plutarch, de def. or. 419 A, joins the *eidola* of Democritus to the demons of Empedocles, Plato, Xenocrates and Chrysippus. In Timoleon c. 1, he calls Democritus superstitious for his prayer to meet favorable images. Modern writers have differed as to whether these images of Democritus were demons. Zeller I. 936 foll. calls them the first suggestion of demons as mediators between philosophy and religion. (On demons see below p. 31.) Windelband. History of Ancient Philosophy (trans. by Cushman) 173 (Cf. 169); Liard, De Democ. Phil. 56, 57; Decharme, Eur. 63, call these images demons. Hirzel, I. 137, 1, with whom Heinze, Xen. 88, agrees, does not accept this view. The suggestion of demons in the images can be avoided only by discrediting the testimony of Sextus and Plutarch, and assuming that they had imposed alien beliefs upon the atomist. The remark of Hirzel, p. 76, upon "Die Spaerliche und vielleicht von Missverstaendnissen nicht freie Ueberlieferung" is just, but would apply with the same cogency to almost every allegorist before Heraclitus, the author of the Homeric Allegories. However, as Democritus was the type of the rationalist, there is a presumption against attributing any superstition to him.

[54] Clem. Alex. Protrep. c. 6. 68. 59 P. (20 S.) Strom. 709 P. (255 S.). It is an atheistical passage, for he says that few educated men address what we now call air as Zeus, and ascribe to it all knowledge and power.

[55] Diog. L. 9. 46. Eustath. 696. 36. Cf. Lobeck, I. 157, 158. Cf. remarks on an explanation given by Diogenes, below p. 17.

[56] Sextus Math. 9. 18. Philodemus p. 76 (Gomperz) seems to say much the same, but the lines are so defective that without Sextus the restitution would appear doubtful. Menander's expression, "That which nourishes me I judge to be god," may be mere literary adornment or exaggeration. Meineke, IV 76 (8. 4) and Gnom. Mon. 490.

[57] N. D. I. 42. 118.

tional deities into things that conduce to man's life and comfort And yet it is possible that Prodicus meant that the ancients worshipped the givers of the gifts, not the gifts.[58] Just as according to one-half of the theory of Democritus they worshipped the causers of thunder and other great natural appearances. In that case Prodicus might either have been a polytheist himself, or a monotheist, who considered the traditional gods as manifestations of the one divine power, as did Plutarch.[59]

Euhemerus is hardly an allegorist, yet he had the same purpose as Democritus and Prodicus had and the same spirit as any atheistic allegorist. He claimed to have found in his travels records of great and good kings and leaders of men, who came to be regarded as superhuman. They had the names of Greek divinities. Hence arose religion.[60]

The chief followers of Euhemerus were Palaephatus,[61] and Polybius,[62] and especially Diodorus.[63] Occasional Euhemerisms are found in authors who are not at all Euhemerists. The scholium on Apollonius Rhodius Argonautica II. 1248, gives several allegoristic and Euhemeristic explanations of the Prometheus myth which are assigned to Agroetas, Theophrastus and Herodorus. Hecataeus also made Cerberus[64] a poisonous snake, and Geryon[65] a king. Like-

[58] Plutarch made such an explanation but without mentioning Prodicus, see below p. 26.

[59] See below p. 26. Cf. Welcker, Prodicus, s. 521 (quoted by Nestle, Euripides, p. 431, 91). Wenn er . . . von den vielen Volksgoettern den einen natuerlichen oder den wahren Gott unterschied . . . so hebt dies nicht die vershrung des einen Gottes in den Goettern als Symbolen oder Organen seiner Wohlthaten und seiner Herrlichkeit nach des Landes Gesetzen auf. Joel. Der Echte u. d. Xen. Sokrates II. 262, Der Anfang der Froemmigkeit ist die Dankbarkeit des Bauern gegen die Natur sagt Prodikos (Cf. Plut. de Is. 378. 379, especially 378 F to 379 D); and Joel connects the doctrine of Prodicus with the Cynic doctrine, as he describes it, of the piety of the farmer.

[60] Eusebius Praep. Evang. II. 2 § 55 foll. Sextus Math. 9, 17, 34, 51. Plut. de Is. 359 D to 360 D. See Euhemeri Reliquae, collected by Geyza Nemethy. Cicero ascribed this doctrine to the Stoics, see below p. 21. Wellman Aegyptisches *Hermes* 31, p. 232, says that Euhemerus, who was a friend of Cassander, developed his historical theory to make the apotheosis of the kings who followed Alexander more acceptable to Greek understanding. According to Gruppe, however, Euhemerus was a delicate humorist, misunderstood by both adherents and opponents, who took as serious myth-making his playful irony upon the Diadochi. (I 16 foll; a history of Euhemerism.) There does not seem to be enough ancient testimony on the subject to support either view. Euhemerus seems to have given the promulgators of religious doctrine the same purpose that Critias assigned to them, namely, to obtain the obedience of the masses (cf. above p. 13.) For Sextus Math. 9. 17 says that according to Euhemerus the powerful men of ancient times, in order that they might increase fear and obedience, persuaded their subjects to worship them as gods. Of course the parallel ends with the purpose. Saintsbury seems to misuse Euhemerism when in Hist. of Crit. I. 187 he calls Tzetzes's physical allegorizing "a cheap pseudo-scientific Euhemerism."

[61] Concerning incredible tales, introduction, Westermann, Script. poet. hist. Gr. p. 268.

[62] For example, in Strabo I. 2, 15 (C. 24).

[63] III. 44-60. Cf. Eustath. Il. p. 1190. On all three, see Grote, I. 368-371; on Euhemerus, 367, 368.

[64] Fr. 346, Mueller, Fr. Hist. Gr.

[65] Ib. Fr. 349.

wise, Ephorus converted the serpent Pytho into a tyrannical king.[65] Even Herodotus accepted the story that some Egyptian priestesses founded Dodona, and reconciled this version with the popular Greek tale by calling the doves of the latter a figurative representation of the priestesses.[67]

The meager remains of the early Cynics do not offer material for the reconstruction of their literary criticism. It is plain, however, that they did not understand all tradition in its literal sense. For Antisthenes explained the god Eros as an affection of the soul, deified by those suffering from an attack of the disease.[68] His exegesis of Homer is illustrated by his comment upon *πολύτροπον*. The epithet held both praise and blame of Ulysses, but it might be wholly free from evil implication if it were intended to apply not to his moral character but to his oratory; that is, he could suit his speech to his audience.[69] This is not allegorical interpretation, but reveals the same intention, namely, to preserve the moral teaching of Homer at the expense of the natural meaning of his words. For here Antisthenes was endeavoring to keep Ulysses as an example of a moral life. Plato's treatment of the same epithet is wholly different; he did not free it from the idea of falsity, and declined to enter into an idle discussion of what Homer might have meant, "since it is impossible to ask the poet himself."[70]

Antisthenes taught that some of the words of the poet were spoken *δόξῃ*, and some *ἀληθείᾳ*[71] *δόξῃ* cannot, of course, have the meaning given to *κατὰ δόξαν* by Plutarch in de aud. po. 17 D. where it expresses the genuine belief of the poet himself, however wrong or false such belief may be. Whether Antisthenes would have said, as the Stoics did later, that the poet always knew the truth and told it allegorically when he spoke *δόξῃ* appears uncertain. Dio's words are: *ὁ δὲ Ζήνων οὐδὲν τῶν τοῦ Ὁμήρου φέγει, ἅμα διηγούμενος καὶ διδάσκων ὅτι τὰ μὲν κατὰ δόξαν, τὰ δὲ κατὰ ἀλήθειαν γέγραφεν, ὅπως μὴ φαίνηται αὐτὸς αὑτῷ μαχόμενος ἔν τισι δοκοῦσιν ἐναντίως εἰρῆσθαι. ὁ δὲ λόγος οὗτος Ἀντισθένους ἐστὶ πρότερον, ὅτι τὰ μὲν δόξῃ, τὰ δὲ ἀληθείᾳ εἴρηται τῷ ποιητῇ· ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν οὐκ ἐξειργάσατο αὐτόν, ὁ δὲ καθ' ἕκαστον τῶν ἐπὶ μέρους ἐδήλωσεν. ἔτι δὲ καὶ Περσαῖος ὁ τοῦ Ζήνωνος κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν ὑπόθεσιν γέγραφε καὶ ἄλλοι πλείους.* It would seem unnecessary to repeat with Antisthenes the words, *τὰ μὲν δόξῃ, τὰ δὲ ἀληθείᾳ* if it was not only in this part

[65] Strabo IX. 422.

[67] II. 54 foll. Cf. VII. 129, on the defile of Tempe, the work of Poseidon, if Poseidon caused earthquakes. See Grote, I. 352 foll.

[68] Clemens Alex. Strom. II. 20, p. 485P.

[69] Schol. Od. I. 1 (Dind. I. p. 9).

[70] Hipp. Mi. 364 E. 365 B-D; 369 D.

[71] Dio. Chrys. LIII. 276 R.

of the teachings of Zeno but also in exculpation of Homer that Antisthenes was his forerunner."

Diogenes explained the sorcery of Medea in restoring old men to youth as the work of gymnastic.[73] But this does not necessarily mean that Diogenes believed that the myth was invented to teach the value of gymnastics. He may well have used the story as an apt illustration of his subject in hand. It is often impossible to determine just how a thinker has used the myth, especially when his exact words have not come down to us, and the context is wanting.

Much surer ground is reached when we come to the Stoics.[74] The testimony on their methods of interpreting Homer is clearer and fuller than for any of their predecessors; more than that, for the first time a definite plan was developed. Their system is the first that has come down to us; that it was really the first elaborated employment of allegoristic is a just inference from the words of

[72] Therefore Duemmler, Antisthenica 24, seems to overstate the effect of this passage when he says that [Antisthenes] non potuit non uti Stoicorum allegoria quam incohasse saltem eum testatur Dio Chrysostomus or. LIII. 276 R. Moreover, Dio does not bear witness that Antisthenes was the originator of this method of criticism, whatever its nature, for he uses πρότερον, not πρῶτον Schrader, 387, seems to agree with Duemmler. That Plato was arguing against Antisthenes in those passages in which he opposed allegorical interpretation, or the belief in the omniscience of Homer, or in which he jested about the origin of names (Duemmler, Ant. 24-39), can hardly be proved. For, in the first place, too little is known of Antisthenes's writings to give assurance that in so many cases the kind of interpretation attacked by Plato belonged to the Cynic. (On Plato's hostility to Antisthenes see Zeller II. 294-300, especially footnotes.) And, in the second place, the ideas opposed by Plato were common, Ion 530 C, and a general tendency was more powerful for evil than any teachers, Rep. 492, therefore it is unlikely that Plato always had individuals in mind. Cf. Shorey, The Unity of Plato's Thought, 4 f. n. 4. Joel. Der Echte u. d. Xen. Sokrates, has carried to the extreme this attempt to find Antisthenes in Plato; see especially II. 146, 148, 149. At any rate these discussions do not aid in the search for Antisthenes's allegoristic. For we know that he is the object of Plato's attack only when we already know that the doctrine opposed is that of the Cynic. Antisthenes used allegories in his teaching, Julian VII. 209 A; 215 C; 217 A. Plato and Xenophon are mentioned in the last two passages. (Cf. Krische 243 foll.; Lobeck I. 159 h). On the allegorical interpretation employed by Antisthenes see Schlemm 34 (cf. 35, 36, 39, 40); Heinze, Xen. 94; Zeller 2, 283; Weber, de Dio Chrys. Cyn. Sec., Leipsiger. Stud. 10. 224. foll. These writers refer to Duemmler. Cf. also Norden Beit. z. gesch. d. Gr. Philos., Jahrb. f. Class. Philol. XIX. Sup. s. 377 foll. Krische I, 234-246. Sengebusch I. 115 foll.

[73] Stob. Eclog. III. c. 29, 92. Cf. Lobeck I. 159 f.n.h. Gomperz Gr. Thinkers (Translated by Magnus) I. 375. The passage in Philodemus p. 70 (Gomp.) is so defective that it seems hardly safe to build a doctrine for Diogenes upon it. It appears to mean that "Diogenes praises Homer because he wrote (not) mythically but truthfully; for he says that he (Homer) considered the air as Zeus; since he says that Zeus knows everything." But cf. Duermler Akad. 143. 2. Sextus, Math. 7. 128, said that Homer, Od. 18. 163, ascribed intelligence to the air.

[74] Their allegoristic has been treated so often that these few paragraphs are inserted here only for the sake of completeness. See especially Zeller III. 321 foll., and Zeller, Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics, trans. by Reichel, 354 foll. (many etymologies are given 362, f. n. 3), and Krische *passim*. Also Sengebusch I. 67 foll.; Flach Int. to Gloss. u. Schol. z. Hes. Theog., and authors referred to at the beginning of this sketch.

Dio Chrysostom.[75] They assumed that Homer wrote with a full knowledge of and acquiescence in Stoic physical and moral dogmas.[76] Whether this assumption was a pious conviction antecedent to the use of the myths to support their own teachings, or whether they consciously wrested the poet's words from their original intention, it is perhaps impossible to determine. The language of Dio, that "Zeno blamed nothing in Homer," would imply the genuineness of their faith. However, either on account of a naive belief, or availing themselves of the convictions of others, they did reconcile tradition with their doctrines so as to gain support from the respect and almost religious awe in which the body of myths about the gods was held.

The defense of Homer against his detractors was the chief motive of some of the writers. It is at least probable that Heraclitus[77] was not expressing only his own view when he gave prominence to this motive for his allegorical explanation of objectionable stories in Homer. By explaining myths about the gods as moral or physical allegories, they found their own beliefs there, and at the same time relieved the myths of any impious or immoral implication discovered in them. They were not the first who did either the one or the other; we have already seen that the followers of Thales and Heraclitus—unless Plato called the latter Homerids to ridicule the search for *ὑπόνοιαι* — discovered in the words of Homer the principles of those philosophers. This method of understanding the myths was a natural, to some extent a necessary, result of the Greek[78] habit of personifying natural phenomena and moral characters; the inevitable corollary to that mythopoeic habit, namely, confusion[79] in the minds of the sincerely religious between the god

[75] See above p. 16.

[76] This was somewhat the attitude of early and mediaeval Christians towards Virgil; they found their own beliefs in the Aeneid, in an allegorical dress. Comparetti, Vergil in the Middle Ages, trans. by Benecke, ch. 7, 8. On the honesty of the allegorists, p. 105 end.

[77] Alleg. Hom. passim. Cf. Krische 393, that Zeno's motive was merely to support his own doctrines. But the remains of Zeno on this point are too scanty to justify a decision. On the serious purpose of the Stoics and their allegoristic see Zeller III, 336, Sie (ihre erklärungen) galten ihnen für das einzige Mittel, um den Glauben ihres Volkes zu retten, um die härtesten Vorwürfe von den Ueberlieferungen und den Dichterwerken abzuwehren, mit denen der Grieche sich von Kindesbeinen angenährt hatte. Mit diesen Ueberlieferungen gänzlich zu brechen, konnten sie sich nicht entschliessen, ihre wissenschaftlichen und sittlichen Ueberzeugen wollten sie ihnen nicht zum Opfer bringen; kann uns Wunder nehmen, wenn sie das unmögliche versuchten, Widersprechendes zu vereinigen, und wenn dieser Versuch sie zu Gewaltsamkeit und Künsteleien jeder Art hindrängte?

[78] Of course not particularly Greek. Cf. Grote I. ch. 16. Grote in this chapter and Gruppe and Schow point out the false results obtained by both ancient and modern writers when they have pushed allegorical or symbolical explanations to an extreme. Cf. Goropius Becamus in Lobeck II. 1051, the objection to the discovery of truth in inspired writings by means of allegorical interpretation is that the interpreter must, like the poet, be inspired. Cf. Plato's similar idea, above p. 9.

[79] On identification of the god in a thing the words of Gruppe I. 49 are suggestive: Wenn Lehrs und die uebrigen Rationalisten die Identification der

and the thing typified by him, or the department of the physical or psychological world over which he presided, was one cause of the development of allegorical interpretation. Etymology, that popular[80] field of philological activity, was abundantly used by the Stoics in aid of their allegorical explanations.

That Zeno wrote on the interpretation of the poets is known from the list of his works given by Diogenees Laertius,[81] from Dio Chrysostom,[82] from Cicero,[83] and the scholia to Hesiod's Theogony.[84] That his method was allegorical is proved by the following: (1) The passage in Dio Chrysostom already quoted under Antisthenes, which is to the effect that Zeno blamed nothing in Homer, but said that the poet wrote some things in accordance with truth, others in accordance with opinion, and that he worked this interpretation out in detail. (2) Cicero:[85] Zeno, Cleanthes and Chrysippus wrote to show that physica ratio non inelegans inclusa est in inpias fabulas. (3) The statement of Minucius Felix[86] that Zeno interpreted Juno as air, Jupiter as the heavens, Neptune as the sea, Vulcan as fire, and the other popular gods as elements. (4) Cicero:[87] Zeno said that ether was a god. (5) Cicero:[88] in Zeno's interpretation of Hesiod's theogony he utterly overthrew the accepted ideas of the gods; for he did not receive Jupiter nor Juno nor Vesta among the gods, but among inanimate things, and taught that these names had, by some symbolism (significationem), been attributed to mere dumb things. (6) Cicero's witness to the great number of the etymologies of Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus, and to their destructive effect upon religion. "For by this method those who are called gods are acknowledged to be natural things, not personal gods."[89] Examples of these etymologies: 'By the Titans were meant the elements of the universe; *Κοῖος* from *ποῖος* the *κ* used for *π* as in the Aeolic dialect; *Κρεῖος* the royal and chief; *Ὑπερίων* the movement up, from *ὑπεράνω ἰέναι*.'[90] "Zeno said that the Cyclopes were *ἐγκυκλίους περιφοράς*."[91]

Goetter mit den Naturscheinungen fuer eine spaete Faelschung der Griechischen Mythologie halten so irren sie doppelt; vollstaendig identificiert wurden die Gottheiten nie und die faculative Identification ist nicht auf die junge Periode beschraenkt. See Plutarch's views below, p. 38 foll.

[80] Cf. Plato Cratylus, See above p. 8, 9.

[81] VII. 4.

[82] See above p. 16.

[83] N. D. I. 15, 36.

[84] On vss. 134, 139.

[85] N. D. II. 24, 63; Cf. 64.

[86] Octav. 19, 10; Pearson, Zeno 111; see Pearson's notes on that fragment.

[87] N. D. I. 15, 36.

[88] N. D. I. 15, 36. Pearson, 110; see his notes.

[89] N. D. III. 24, 63.

[90] Schol. 134, Hes. Theog. The text of the following sentence about Iapetus seems too doubtful to make it so valuable as the others; see Flach on this scholion. Cf. Cornutus, Theol. Gr. Comp. ch. 17.

[91] Schol. 139.

In the list of the books of Cleanthes[92] given by Diogenes[93] are three that were probably filled with allegorical explanations, On the gods, On the poet, On the giants. Cleanthes tried to accommodate to his own beliefs the doctrines that were ascribed to Orpheus and Musaeus and the teachings of Homer, Hesiod, Euripides and other poets.[94] By the word *μῶλυ* in Od. 10, 305, he said that reason was allegorically set forth, by which impulse and passion *μωλύονται*.[95] His etymologies were sometimes so absurd that Plutarch[96] said that Cleanthes was in jest, as when he pretended to explain: *τό*

'Ζεῦ πάτερ Ἰδηθεν μεδέων'

καὶ τό

Ζεῦ ἄνα Δωδωναῖε'

εἰλεύων ἀναγιγνώτκειν ὑφ' ἓν, ὡς τὸν ἐκ τῆς γῆς ἀναθυμιώμενον ἀέρα διὰ τὴ ἀνάδυσιν ἀναδωδωναῖον ὄντα.

Other etymologies showing his allegorical interpretation of myths are of Persephone,[97] of Dionysus[98] (as the sun), of Apollo[99] (also as the sun), and of various epithets of Apollo.[98]

As seen above,[99] Chrysippus used allegory to explain the myths, as Zeno and Cleanthes did.[100] According to Cicero[101] he sometimes made one thing god, sometimes another, as mind, the universe, the elements, or men who had obtained immortality. "He said that he was ether whom men called Jupiter." Neptune the air that permeated the sea, Ceres that of the earth, and he treated the names of the other gods in the same way. He called Zeus fate,[102] also. He wished to fit the fables of Orpheus, Musaeus, Hesiod and Homer to those things which he himself said, ut etiam veterrimi poetae, qui haec ne suspicati quidem sunt, Stoici fuisse videantur.[103] His ety-

[92] See above p. 19.

[93] VII. 175.

[94] Philodemus de piet. 13 (p. 80 Gomp.) Pearson fr. 54. Cf. Plut. de def. or. 415, F, the Stoics imposed their doctrine of the conflagration of the world upon Heraclitus, Orpheus and Hesiod.

[95] Pearson fr. 66, quoted from Appollon. Soph. Lex. Hom. p. 114 ed. Bekker.

[96] De aud. po. 31 E.

[97] Plut. de Is. 377 D.

[98] Pearson 57, 58, 59, 60; all from Macrob. Sat.

[99] P. 19.

[100] His work How to Listen to the Poets was probably filled with allegorical interpretations, Diog. L. VII. 200.

[101] N. D. I. 15. 39, 40. Cf. Philodemus de piet. 11-14 (p. 77-81 Gomp.), a more detailed statement of Chrysippus's views on the gods than that in Cicero. According to Krische, this treatise de pietate, which he ascribes to the Epicurean Phaedrus, was Cicero's source for the passages in the natura deorum on the Stoics. Diels Dox. 121 foll. takes Phaedrus as the common source of Cicero and Philodemus.

[102] Plut. Stoic. rep. 1050 B on Chrysippus's interpretation of Il. 1. 5, Zeus meant fate and nature. Cf. Galen Plac. Hipp. 348 foll., Chrysippus explained allegorically the birth of Athena, Hes. Theog. 886 foll.; the goddess was mind.

[103] Cic. N. D. I. 15. 41. Cicero went on to say that Diogenes of Babylon followed Chrysippus in this figurative method, and explained the birth of Minerva by a physical allegory. On the allegoristic of Diogenes cf. Philodemus de piet. 15 (82 Gomp.). See Seneca de Benef. I. 3. 8. [Chrysippus] nec his [his arguments] fabulas, sed haec fabulis inserit. On this use of the poets as

mology of Zeus will perhaps serve as an example, though it is not necessarily allegorical. Zeus[104] is from ζῆν, he is called Δία because all things are δι' αὐτόν.[105]

The Stoics accepted all the unliteral explanations of the popular religion that had found favor with their predecessors;[106] how much of this eclecticism, however, was in use among the older Stoics, it is, of course, impossible to determine; but Persaeus[107] said that men of signal benefit to their race had come to be called gods, thus showing himself a follower of Euhemerus.

The extant allegorical works written before Plutarch are Allegoriae Homericae of Heraclitus (in the time of Augustus), and Compendium Theologiae Graecae of Cornutus (in the time of Nero). They are both plainly Stoic in method, but exhibit widely different purposes. While the book of Cornutus is but a tiresome list of etymologies of the names of the gods and of their epithets that aims to show that the whole hierarchy of the Greek religion was a figurative expression of physical doctrine,[107a] Heraclitus explains in detail the true meaning of the passages in Homer that have been attacked as impious. Many chapters from Heraclitus have passed into the Homeric scholia;[108] the Pseudo-Plutarchian de vita et poesi Homeri,[109] and the Stoic passages in Porphyry's Homeric questions[109] and in Eustathius's[110] comments upon the Homeric poems are so much like the Allegoriae Homericae that they must all be supposed to have a common source.

The purpose[111] of Heraclitus was to defend Homer against his detractors. He began by acknowledging that Homer was impious if he were not allegorizing. But as he had not always been a teacher of Greek youth, he must still be considered as a sacred writer,[112] and although the foolish and unlearned may fail to understand the allegories our duty is to find what he really meant in the appar-

witnesses see Diog. L. 10. 27, on Epicurus, Zeno and Aristotle; Galen de plac. Hipp. 302 on Chrysippus. Yet Galen expressed his surprise at the generosity of Chrysippus, in quoting passages that supported the doctrine that he was trying to refute, III. 300.

[104] Stob. ecl. I. 48 (s. 26). Arnim. II. fr. 1062, 1063. Other etymologies are in the fragments 1084, 1085, 1089, 1094, 1095, 1098, 1099.

[105] Chrysippus gave an allegorical interpretation of a picture, Clem. Hom. V. 18.667; Origen c. Cels. IV. 48.540.

[106] Ps. Plut. Plac. 879 C. foll., Stoic theories of the origin of religious beliefs.

[107] Cic. N. D. I. 15. 38. Cf. on the Stoics in general II. 24. 62. On their use of a theory akin to that of Prodicus II. 23. 60-62; physical allegory II. 24. 63 foll:; in this passage are many etymologies. On etymologies cf. also Diog. L. VII. 147. On their physical allegory see Plutarch de Is. 367. C. On psychological allegory. Plut. Amat. 757 B.

[107a] His closing paragraph, however, expresses a firm belief in the wisdom of the ancients, and proclaims his own pious purpose of leading the young to religion but not to superstition.

[108] Schrader II. 394.

[109] Ib. 393 foll.

[110] Schow 227, 228.

[111] Ch. 1. He referred to Plato with bitterness C. 4, 12, 17, 21; cf. above p. 9.

[112] C. 1. Cf. Philo below p. 22.

ently reprehensible stories.[112] He is the source of all philosophies.[114] Since he and the other poets have manifestly made use of allegories, they have pointed out the way to interpret their own works;[115] even philosophers use allegory.[116] His allegorical explanations of the battle of the gods will be sufficient to show his treatment of the myths as either psychological or physical allegory. After allowing some plausibility to the suggestion that the hostile meeting of the gods typified the conjunction of the seven planets and the consequent destruction of all things, he pronounced the following conception of the meaning to be clearer and more in accordance with Homer's philosophy.[117] The poet opposed to vices, virtues; to physical forces, their opposites; as, Athena to Ares and Aprodite: wisdom to folly and incontinence. Hermes to Leto: logical speech to forgetfulness. Apollo to Poseidon: the sun to water.[118]

Philo Judaeus[119] had the same ideas about his sacred literature that the Stoics had about theirs. Just as Heraclitus believed Homer the source of all wisdom, so Philo believed the Old Testament the source not only of religious truth, but of all truth.[120] Truth was sometimes expressed literally, sometimes figuratively in order that it might accommodate itself to the weaker sort of men,[121] yet not all men could grasp the hidden meaning,[122] as Heraclitus, too, recognized. He reminds us again of Heraclitus[123] when he says that sometimes the sacred writings would lead to impiety or to atheism if they were not understood allegorically.[124] Sometimes both a historical fact and a spiritual truth were conveyed by the words,[125] just as Plutarch said of the Isis myth.[126] He gave different allegorical explanations of the same thing,[127] again like Plutarch.

[113] C. 3. Cf. Pindar O. 2. 91, "There is many an arrow in my quiver, full of speech to the wise, but for the many, they need interpreters." And frag. of Soph. in Plut. de Pyth. or. 406 F, god himself teaches the wise by riddles. And Sallustius, de diis c. 3.

[114] C. 4, 13, 22, 34. "He is not only an allegorical philosopher, but even an allegorical farmer," c. 35. On Homer as source of wisdom see Sengebusch I. 132, 133, 135, 137. But Sengebusch's acknowledgment of the debt of later writers to Homer is not exactly on the point in question, as it does not show that they derived their *dogmas* from the poet.

[115] C. 5; at the end, an interesting contrast between *τὸ λεγόμενον* and *τὸ νοούμενον*.

[116] C. 24.

[117] C. 53.

[118] C. 54-58. Cf. below p.40 f, n. 216.

[119] Since Philo's allegoristic is not applied to Greek literature but to the Hebrew Bible, it will be sufficient for this sketch to bring out some of his principles and methods as they are set down in Siegfried, 160 foll., and Zeller, V. 347 foll.

[120] Siegfried 161.

[121] Ib. 162. Cf. Plato Rep. 376 E. Max. Tyr. X. 5. Cf. Plutarch below p. 30.

[122] Siegfried 164. Cf. Heraclitus, above p. 21.

[123] Above p. 21.

[124] Siegfried, 165, 164. Cf. Zeller V. 348.

[125] Siegfried, 164.

[126] Below p. 30, 31.

[127] Zeller V. 351. For Plutarch see below p. 33.

We know little about the allegorical explanations of the grammarians. Aristarchus was opposed to the allegorical method of interpreting Homer.[128] But he admitted etymologies of the names of the gods,[129] Crates of Mallus was a Stoic philosopher, and wrote on Homer.[130] He described the throwing of Hephaestos from heaven as a physical allegory.[131] He made the πέλειαι of Odyssey 12.62 equal to πλειάδες, that nourished Zeus (upper ether) with moisture.[132] Aristorchus[133] followed Eratosthenes[134] in taking something of a historical view of the poems, while Crates held the Stoic doctrine of the omniscience of Homer.[135]

[128] Eustathius p. 3, 40, 604. Cf. Wolff, Proleg. 165. Sengebusch, I. 60; 124 foll. on Aristarchus's relation to Plato.
[129] Eustath, 571.
[130] Suidas s. v.
[131] Heraclitus, Hom. Alleg. c. 27.
[132] Athenaeus, 490 B-E. Athenaeus says that Crates got this explanation from Moero of Byzantium. Cf. Porph. and Eustath. Il. 18, 239. Wolff, Proleg. 278, 9.
[133] Strabo, I. 31.
[134] Strabo II. 299; I. 23; I. 15, 3. Cf. Sengebusch I. 42.
[135] Strabo III. 157. Cf. Wolff l. c, susemihl, Gesch. Gr. Lit. I. 415. Sengebusch I. 117. "The Pergamene school formed the third link in a chain of allegorists, of which the other two were the Cynics and the Stoics." On Crates see Schrader, 391 foll.; Sengebusch, I. 60.

PART II.—PLUTARCH.

Plutarch's allegorical interpretation of myths was the logical consequence of his own religious belief and of his regard for religious traditions. He believed in a supreme being, immortal and beneficent and wise, but not all powerful. God was not the cause of all things, but only of the good,[136] for a principle of evil[137] was inherent in nature; this doctrine of the two principles of good and evil at war with each other was "held by most men, and by the wisest men."[138] But the principle of good was more powerful.[139] It was Plutarch's view that Plato taught that this principle of evil was the intractability of matter under the spirit of disorder.[140] The supreme god assigned various fields of activity to his subordinates.[141] This divine power was universal, and was worshipped by all men, although they called it by different names, and observed different forms and rites in its service; in their worship they made use of symbols, often dark and misleading, so that some fell into superstition and others into atheism.[142] Although god could not control

[136] Cf. Plato, Rep. 379 B.
[137] De Is. 369 A foll.
[138] 369 D foll.
[139] 371 A.
[140] De an. proc. 1015 A, C-E. Cf. de tran. an. 473 F foll. Plutarch found no contradiction between Plato's earlier and later discussions on this subject: 'Plato often veiled his thought, and called the two opposed causes the same and the other [see Tim. 35 A]; however, when he was older he wrote in the Laws [896 foll.] without enigma and symbol but in plain words that the world was not moved by one soul; it was moved at the least by two, one the cause of good, the other of the opposite to good,' de Is. 370 F. Yet in the Politicus 269 E Plato says explicitly that you must not think that there are two gods who rule the world.
[141] But sometimes these subordinate deities were conceived of as only names of the one god: 'Justice and Right are said to be the assessors of Zeus to show that he cannot rule without them. But he is himself justice and right,' ad princ. inerud. 781 B.
[142] De Is. 377 F,

οὐχ ἑτέρους παρ' ἑτέροις οὐδὲ βαρβάρους καὶ Ἕλληνας οὐδὲ νοτίους καὶ βορείους· ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἥλιος καὶ σελήνη καὶ οὐρανὸς καὶ γῆ καὶ θάλασσα κοινὰ πᾶσιν, ὀνομάζεται δ' ἄλλως ὑπ' ἄλλων, οὕτως ἑνὸς λόγου τοῦ ταῦτα κοσμοῦντος καὶ μιᾶς προνοίας ἐπιτροπευούσης καὶ δυνάμεων ὑπουργῶν ἐπὶ πάντα τεταγμένων, ἕτεραι παρ' ἑτέροις κατὰ νόμους γεγόνασι τιμαί καὶ προσηγορίαι· καὶ συμβόλοις χρῶνται καθιερωμένοις οἱ μὲν ἀμυδροῖς οἱ δὲ τρανοτέροις, ἐπὶ τὰ θεῖα τὴν νόησιν ὁδηγοῦντες οὐκ ἀκινδύνως. ἔνιοι γὰρ ἀποσφαλέντες παντάπασιν εἰς δεισιδαιμονίαν ὤλισθον, οἱ δὲ φεύγοντες ὥσπερ ἕλος τὴν δεισιδαιμονίαν ἔλαθον αὖθις ὥσπερ εἰς κρημνὸν ἐμπεσόντες τὴν ἀθεότητα.

all the forces of the universe, yet the order of the world was a moral order; even fate moved by moral law, and men and cities reaped the inevitable results of their own acts.[143]

Apparently he thought that men of a happier age had had direct inspiration from god, for he said that the source of all knowledge that did not come through the senses was perhaps myth, custom, or reason; therefore we have had three classes of teachers of religion—poets, lawgivers, philosophers;[144] and, "Plato, Pythagoras, Xenocrates, and Chrysippus followed the ancient theologians in the demon doctrine."[145] The atheistical view that lawgivers invented religion in order to subject the people to their government is suggested by the remark that superstition is a valuable bridle in the hands of rulers.[146] However, it is not conceivable that Plutarch believed that religion in its higher sense was a conscious invention of the lawgivers. He doubtless meant that rulers of men took advantage of particular superstitions, or, possibly, suggested some superstitious ideas that would tend to subject the masses more thoroughly. The men of ancient times who made myths and instituted religious rites possessed a clearer religious truth than their descendants. For to the former the dark funereal rites performed in the worship of certain gods were symbolic of grief at the passing of the fruits of the earth, which were the gifts of the gods;[147] while to the latter these rites represented the sorrow of men for the death of the gods themselves.[148]

However, in spite of this belief in the wisdom of the ancients, he did not go to the Stoic extreme of using Homer and Hesiod as sacred scriptures, to be defended against all attacks and to be relied upon as infallible authorities for his own teachings. Homer was

See the whole passage 377 C-378 D. On superstition and atheism cf. 355 D, and de superst. 171 F; in the latter passage much the same language as in the Isis. Cf. Hirzel, der Dial. II. 218, Nach dem Vorgange der akademischen Skeptiker hat er [Plut. in de Is.] sich zwischen den Aberglauben des Volkes und dem Unglauben mancher Philosophen den Mittelweg einer reineren und tieferen Gottes -erkentniss und -verehrung gesucht. On the unity of God, cf. de Is. 382 D; de E. 393 A, B. On Plutarch's idea of God, see Volkmann, II. 69 foll., 248 foll.; Zeller III. 166 foll.; Schlemm 51.

[143] De aud. po. 23 E.

[144] Amat. 763 C. Cf. de Is. 369 B.

[145] De Is. 360 E. Cf. de proc. an. 1030 B, theologians were the earliest philosophers; in this place poets also are quoted to support the author's thesis, so we again have the three sources of opinion. Cf. Dio Chrys. XII. 391 R. foll.: sources of belief in the gods are innate ideas, poetry, laws, statues of gods, philosophy. S. Aug. de civ. IV. 27, the orator Scaevola said that there were three classes of gods—the gods of the poets, of the philosophers, of the rulers. Cf. Aristotle above p. 10 on poets and myth-makers as teachers. See Oakesmith, XIX. On the origin of religion, above p. 13 foll.

[146] De gen. Soc. 580A. Cf. above p. 13.

[147] De Is. 378 F.

[148] 379 D. foll. This is the answer of the faithful to unbelievers like Prodicus, see above p. 14.

certainly not sacred to him, for he freely blamed the poet's words,[149] and rejected poetic teachings about the gods or about virtue and vice when they did not accord with his own high religious and moral ideas.[150] Moreover, he considered philosophers of so much greater authority than poets that he advised the readers of poetry whenever they met with useful precepts to show that they were found in some philosopher also, in order that the precepts might thereby gain in force.[151] Poetry as a vehicle of truth fell below religious teachings as well as below philosophy; and poetic myths were webs woven entirely of false threads, while religious myths always had an underlying woof of instruction.[152] Moreover, poetry was less serious than the teachings of the priests;[153] its aim was chiefly pleasure.[154] It is just in this reasonable view of the popular religious poetry that he especially differed from the Stoics. His statement that the poets sometimes deviated from the truth through their own mistaken beliefs[155] was in direct opposition to Zeno's words, that Homer sometimes spoke the exact truth, and sometimes spoke in the form of popular beliefs.[156] Nor was Homer of peculiar authority to Plutarch; when he appealed to great writers for testimony[157] and by way of illustration, he joined others with

[149] De aud. po. 15 C; 16 E; 20 C foll.; Lycurgus c. 4.

[150] De aud. po. 16 D. foll.

[151] De aud. po. 35 F. Therefore his finding *γνῶθι σεαυτόν* (de aud. po. 36 A; Septem 164 B, C.), and *μηδὲν ἄγαν* (Septem 164 C) in Homer, and Plato's *τὸ ἀδικεῖν κάκιον εἶναι τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι* in Hesiod (de aud. po. 36 A. B.), is not a proof that he held the poets the source of all wisdom.

[152] De Is. 358 E.

[153] Lycurgus c. 4. Pericles c. 1, 2.

[154] Twice in de aud. po. this aim was made most definite, 16 A, *ἡδονὴν ἀκοῆς καὶ χάριν, ἣν οἱ πλεῖστοι* [poets] *διώκουσιν*; and 17A, *τοῦτο δὲ παντὶ δῆλον, ὅτι μυθοποίημα καὶ πλάσμα πρὸς ἡδονὴν ἢ ἔκπληξιν ἀκροατοῦ γέγονε.*

Mr. F. M. Padelford, in the introduction to his translation of Plutarch de aud. po., Essays on the Study and Use of Poetry by Plutarch and Basil the Great, in Yale Studies in English XV, seems to be a little unfair when he says, p. 30, that Plutarch nowhere tells us what the aim of poetry is. As I have shown above, he said explicitly in two passages that pleasure is the aim of the poets. The translator seems to have overlooked the educational purpose of the essay. Naturally, as this is not a treatise on poetry, Plutarch did not enter into a full discussion of the aim of poetry. Butcher, also, in Ar. Theory of Poetry and Fine Art, overlooks this distinction in his criticism of Plato, chapter on The End of Fine Art, and Plutarch, p. 215, but gives Aristotle the benefit of it, p. 218.

[155] De aud. po. 16A, *ψεύδονται ἀοιδοὶ .... τὰ δ' ἄκοντες*; F, *πλείονα δ' ἃ μὴ πλάττοντες ἀλλ' οἰόμενοι καὶ δοξάζοντες αὐτοὶ....τὸ ψεῦδος*; 17B, *ταῦτα δ' ἤδη κατὰ δόξαν εἴρηται καὶ πίστιν αὐτῶν, ἣν ἔχουσιν ἀπάτην περὶ θεῶν καὶ ἄγνοιαν.* See 16 foll. for a discussion of the topic.

[156] Dio Chrys. LIII. 276 R. Cf. above p. 16.

[157] He appealed to poets as authority upon all sorts of questions. For instance, in support of Plato's belief that liquids were swallowed into the lungs he referred not only to physicians but also to Euripides, Aicaeus, Eupolis, Eratosthenes, de Stoic. rep. 1047 C, D.

Homer, as Euripides, Pindar, Sophocles and Menander in de aud. po. c. 4; and the Symposiacs are full of quotations from many different authors. He deliberately and confessedly extended the application of a useful admonition or suggestion,[158] and praised Chrysippus for advising such a free use of literature.[159] But this is a different thing from forcing[160] the meaning of an author in order to find his own doctrine in the writing; that misuse of authorities he explicitly condemned;[161] likewise the injustice of wresting a passage from its connection.[162] Thus we see that, like Xenophanes and Plato, Plutarch found much to blame in Homer. Unlike Xenophanes, he did not attack the poet; on the contrary, he wrote an essay especially to show how to use the poets, and in that essay he acknowledged the value of the teaching of Homer. Unlike Plato, he did not write a Utopia, and therefore had no occasion to banish Homer. He did not think it possible[163] to banish Homer from an actual cur-

[158] Ex. com. in Hes. fr. 51.

[159] De aud. po. 34 B.

[160] The meanings forced upon Homer and Hesiod in de prim. frig. 948 E, F, and 952 A are in an essay that is merely a rhetorical exercise, and evidently neither serious nor important in the author's eyes.

[161] De def. or. 415 F.; de an. proc. 1013 B.

[162] Non posse 1086 D; adv. Colot. 1108 D. I do not recollect any passage in which Plutarch was himself guilty of this injustice. The arguments in the works against the Stoics are often quibbling, but the loss of the books against which they were directed prevents our knowing whether he treated their words unfairly. If Galen, de plac. Hipp. 300, 301, correctly quotes Plutarch in the Homeric Exercises he there directed the writer to choose from other authors whatever would support his own doctrines, but to pass by whatever was opposed to them. That Plutarch found all truth in Homer, and used him as support for his own doctrines, is maintained by Amoneit, de Plut. Stud. Hom. 16 foll. What has been given above is, perhaps, a sufficient refutation of that judgment. Cf. Hatch, The Influence of Greek Ideas, etc., p. 57, "There was an instinct in the Greek mind, as there is in modern times, which rebelled against . . . tendencies to draw a moral from all that Homer wrote, and to read philosophy into it." In illustration he says that Plutarch "said that Homer reflected faithfully the chequered lights and shadows of human life, and sometimes that the existence of immorality in Homer must clearly be allowed, but that if a balance were struck between the good and evil, the good would be found largely to predominate." He refers to Plutarch de aud. po. 24. 25.

[163] De aud. po. 15 A. It seems certain that no writer after Plato, especially a Platonist, could have touched upon the exclusion of poetry from the training of young men without having in mind Plato's banishment of the poets from his ideal State. When Schlemm 20, 21 supposes that Plutarch was not thinking of Plato, because he did not mention Plato, he probably overlooks the different objects of the de aud. po. and the Republic. There was no need, in a practical treatise on education, to refer to the dream of an ideal State. It is true that Plutarch did not causas offensionis eius [Plato's] refutare; he could not do that, because he agreed with Plato entirely that the reasons did exist; but he adduced other reasons for keeping poetry as a part of the education of young men. He defended the poets not merely by calling attention to their habit of using false stories, chapter 2, especially 17 D, chapter 7, but also by teaching the readers of poetry (1) to use their own judgment and not to yield to the authority of great writers, chapter 9, or to the example of heroes, chapter 8; (2) to admire the skill of the artist in imitating human nature, not the things imitated, chapters 3, 7; (3) to observe that the poet himself often condemns what is wrong, or brings the malefactor to justice, chapter 4; (4) to feel less respect for the poets by noticing their contradictions, and to oppose to the evil in a poet the virtuous words or deeds

riculum, nor, indeed, desirable,[164] for the good exceeded the evil[165] and poetry furnished a valuable propaedeutic to philosophy.[166]

Plutarch would preserve the ancient faith of the fathers, and he deprecated the discrediting of myths about the gods; for if one story were shaken it would bring all religion under suspicion.[167] Yet he did not hesitate to reject such parts of the myth as offended his moral or aesthetic sense; in recounting the adventures of Isis he said that he omitted the parts that were *δυσφημότατα*[168] and in general he expressed himself as neither altogether believing nor altogether disbelieving myths.[169] They were not to be regarded in the light of true relations, *λόγοις*, but from them should be extracted *τὸ πρόσφορον*[170] .... *τὸ κατὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα*.[171] Here is the key to Plutarch's treatment of myths and religious rites; his interest, as in the Lives, was mainly ethical;[172] and the real meaning was to be got at by an allegorical explanation. *κατὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα.*

of others, 20C foll.; (5) to understand the exact sense in which the poet has used words, that is, whether literally or metaphorically, chapter 6. Cf. below p. 36 foll. As Schlemm acknowledges, Plutarch mentions many of the passages censured by Plato:

Plato Rep.	Plut. de aud. po.
379—Two jars of Zeus, Il. 24, 527	24A.
379—Gods induce violation of oath	24 B; 32 B.
379—Strife of the gods, Il. 20	20 E; 16 D, E.
380—Zeus causes the destruction of a house, Aesch. Niobe (?) frag.	17B.
386—Terrors of death and Hades, Il. 16, 856, et al.	17 C foll.
388—Sorrow of Achilles, Il. 24, 10 and 18, 23	33 A.
390—Achilles's abuse of Agamemnon, Il, 1, 225	19 C.
390—Adultery of Ares and Aphrodite, Od. 8, 266	19 F.
391—Achilles's treatment of Hector's body, Il. 22, 395	19 C.

[164] 15 A, B foll. Cf. Amat. 769 C, the power of poetry both for good and evil.

[165] Lycurgus, c. 4.

[166] De aud. po. 15 F, 37B.

[167] Amat. 756 B. Cf. Plat. Rep. 365 E, (words that Glaucon puts into the mouth of the defender of an appearance of justice) since it is from the same source, namely, myths and poets, that we learn of the existence and providence of the gods, and of their yielding to prayers and propitiation, we must accept both dogmas or neither. Also Plut. cons. ad ux. 612 D, since it is more difficult to disbelieve than to believe the doctrine of our fathers on the immortality of the soul, let us preserve the outward form and keep pure the inner faith.

[168] De Is. 358 E. Cf. 355 D, *τῶν ἀχρήστων σφόδρα καὶ περιττῶν ἀφαιρεθέντων.*

[169] Amat. 762 A.

[170] De aud. po. 20 B, C, as philosophers use examples from history to admonish and instruct, so poets invent and devise their own stories for the same purpose, and teach by their very myth-making.

[171] De Is. 374 E. Cf. de glor. Ath. 348 A, B for a definition of myths, *ὁ δὲ μῦθος εἶναι βούλεται λόγος ψευδὴς ἐοικὼς ἀληθινῷ*; here, however, there is no necessary implication that a myth is an allegory.

[172] Cf. Oakesmith XX, "It is this desire of making the wisdom and traditions of the past available for ethical usefulness which actuates his attempt to reconcile the contradictions, and remove the crudities and inconsistencies in the three sources of religious knowledge."

In the essay on the Isis myth he developed at length this belief, that religious tradition taught moral truth under a figurative form. "Philosophy is hidden for the most part in myths and stories that hold dim reflections of the truth; this the Egyptians signified by placing sphinxes before their temples to show that their religion contains an enigmatic[173] wisdom."[174] "The myth is a representation of some idea that has the power to suggest to the mind other ideas."[175] Often a reasonable explanation of objectionable things in literature and tradition could be found.[176] Sometimes the truth in poetry or myths was purposely hidden from the vulgar.[177] The figurative and enigmatic language served the purpose of arousing discussion and of causing men to think.[178]

Yet a story that was used to convey moral instruction or physical fact was not, according to Plutarch, therefore necessarily fiction. It might be a true account of the experiences of living beings.[179] In the interest of piety we should have to distinguish to

[173] Cf. de Is. 366 C, and again D, *αἰνίττεσθαι*, and in many other places. Cf. de Pyth. or. 409 D, *τὰ αἰνίγματα καὶ τὰς ἀλληγορίας καὶ τὰς μεταφορὰς τῆς μαντικῆς ἀνακλάσεις οὔσας πρὸς τὸ θνητὸν καὶ φανταστικόν*. For word *αἰνίττομαι* in Plato see above p. 8 f. n. 16.

[174] De Is. 354 C. Cf. Amat. 762 A, 'There are scattered throughout the Egyptian mythology certain slight and obscure emanations from the truth.' De Is. 354 F, Pythagoras probably borrowed his symbolic method from the Egyptians. Cf. Iamblichus, Life of Pythagoras p. 103, the Egyptians taught by symbols. Cf. de Is. 355 C, 357 F, for the Egyptian use of symbols not in religion.

[175] De Is. 359 A. Cf. 358 E—359A; 377C; 378A, B (quoted below, p. 33); fr. de daed. Plat. Sec. 1. With the opening words of this fragment, *ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἡ παλαιὰ φυσιολογία καὶ παρ' Ἕλλησι καὶ βαρβάροις λόγος ἦν φυσικὸς ἐγκεκρυμμένος μύθοις τὰ πολλά* [cf. *ἐγκεκρυμμένης τὰ πολλὰ μύθοις* in de Is. 354C], compare Dio Chrys. LIII. 275 R. for the established belief in later times that the earliest writers taught physical science by myths. For comment and many references see Lobeck I. 155 foll. Cf. de daed. Plat. Sec. 3, *τὸ συμβολικὸν εἶδος ἐν .... τοῖς μύθοις*.

But on these passages in this fragment see below p. 52 f. n. 286. With this definition of the myth compare Ruskin's definition. Queen of the Air, p. 2, "A myth (.....) is a story with a meaning attached to it, other than it seems to have at first." But surely the word is used both in Greek and in English without any such implication. Cf. Plutarch's own definition given above p. 29 f. n. 171.

[176] De Is. 353 E, 355 B-D. De aud. po. 19 E-20 D. Cf. 24B, words sometimes employed in their usual sense, *κυρίως*, sometimes in an unusual sense. Cf. de Pyth. or. 402 E. See Volkmann 237 foll.; Zeller III. 198 f. n. 4.

[177] De E. 388 F. Cf. fr. of Sophocles quoted with approval in de Pyth. or. 406 F, god teaches the wise by riddles. Heraclitus, Alleg. Hom. c. 3, Philo de somn. I. 656, 40; quod. deus immut. 11 (I. 280).

[178] De E. 385 C, D; 386 E. Cf. Sallustius de diis c. 3. Cf. Ruskin, Queen of the Air, 22, you are bettered by all great art "partly by a gift of unexpected truth, which you shall only find by slow mining for it—which is withheld on purpose, and close-locked, that you may not get it till you have forged the key of it in a furnace of your own heating."

[179] De Is. 358 F. Cf. Wyttenbach ed. Plut. Mor. XIII. 185, Fabula non mere allegorica, ut contendit Jabloniskius, Panth. Aeg. P. I. p. 143, sed est et historica et allegorica. Cf. Philo above p. 22.

what class of living beings the personages of any story belong. If their characters, acts or sufferings were unworthy the dignity of the gods, as in the Isis myth, they must not be recognized as divine.[180] On the other hand, to explain religious myths as histories of the great men of the past led to atheism. Besides, it was improbable that accounts of the doings of mere men could ever be raised to the level of sacred histories; if Alexander was not deified, was it likely that any human being was elevated to the rank of a god?[181] "Therefore they give the better account of the myth who judge that the stories related of Typhon, Osiris and Isis give the experiences of neither gods nor men but of mighty demons, whom Plato, Pythagoras, Xenocrates and Chrysippus, following the teachings of the ancient theologians, described as more powerful than men, but not of unmixed divine nature, for they possessed both souls and bodies, and were subject to pleasure and pain. As among men, so among demons, some are better, some worse."[182] Osiris and Isis were translated from good demons into gods; Typhon remained a suffering and malevolent demon.[183] The compatibility of a matter of fact and allegorical significance is explicitly argued elsewhere. In the life of Pericles, chapter 6, Plutarch showed that both the scientist Anaxagoras and the seer Lampon might be correct in their explanations of the single horn of the ram given to Pericles. The one showed the physiological cause of the peculiarity, the other its prophetic meaning for the Athenian government, that it was soon to have one leader, not both Pericles and Thucydides. It was the province of the scientist to investigate *ἐκ τίνων γέγονε καὶ πῶς πέφυκε*, of the seer to pronounce *πρὸς τί γέγονε καὶ τί σημαίνει*. And those who say that the discovery of the cause is the doing away with the significance do not consider that they are setting aside the instruments, *τὰ τεχνητά*, of the symbols together with the divine relations.

Plutarch believed that in religious rites as in myths lay a hidden truth.[184] "For there is nothing unreasonable nor mythical nor intro-

[180] 358 E.

[181] 359 E-360D. Cf. Diod. Sic. I. 13, 4 foll., same beneficent character of Isis and Osiris, but Euhemeristic explanation. On Euhemerism see above p. 15.

[182] 360 D. Cf. de def. or. 417 E, *καὶ μὴν ὅσας ἔν τε μύθοις καὶ ὕμνοις λέγουσι καὶ ἄδουσι, τοῦτο μὲν ἁρπαγὰς τοῦτο δὲ πλάνας θεῶν κρύψεις τε καὶ φυγὰς καὶ λατρείας, οὐ θεῶν εἰσιν ἀλλὰ δαιμόνων παθήματα καὶ τύχαι μνημονευόμεναι δι' ἀρετὴν καὶ δύναμιν αὐτῶν.*

[183] On demons, 360 D-363 D. Cf. de def. or. 415 foll.; de E. 394 C. Heinze, Xenokrates 78 foll. Grote I. 378-381. Above p. 13.

[184] Fr. de daed. Plat. Sec. 1, *μάλιστα δ' οἱ περὶ τὰς τελετὰς ὀργιασμοὶ καὶ τὰ δρώμενα συμβολικῶς ἐν ταῖς ἱερουργίαις τὴν τῶν παλαιῶν ἐμφαίνει διάνοιαν.*

duced by superstition in the essential rites of religion, but of some rites there are ethical and useful causes and others are not uninfluenced by historical or physical considerations."[185] "Ceremonies were established by Isis to commemorate her sufferings and wanderings and her deeds of wisdom and courage; into the most sacred rites she put images and hidden meanings and imitations of her experiences to instruct and console men and women under like afflictions. And she and Osiris, changed on account of their virtue from good demons into gods, as were later Heracles and Dionysus, receive honors of both demons and gods."[186] The most extreme expression of the spiritual value of religious observances occurs in the fragment of his commentaries upon Hesiod; it is that propitiation of the gods does not alter them, but helps us.[187] His words on religious observances carried with them a peculiar authority, for he was himself a priest of Apollo, and the book on Isis was addressed to Clea, a priestess of Isis.

Plutarch's allegorical interpretation exhibited the same intellectual habits and mental bias as his other literary activities, an absence of historical perspective and an inclination to moral consideration upon all occasions. While the uncritical spirit of his times and of the temper of his own mind kept him from judging poem or myth in the light of the conditions of its production, he was saved from the absurdities of some allegorists by his rare common sense.[188] He explicitly objected to forced interpretations. γλισχρῶς ἀλληγοροῦσι;[189] and once in the Amatorius[190] declined to make use of the slight emanations of truth from the Egyptian mythology on the ground that it required a clever pathfinder to follow the traces of truth there. Poetry and myths and religious rites held for

The mysteries teach the nature of demons, de def. or. 417 C. Both tradition and the mysteries of Dionysus teach immortality, cons. ad ux. 611 D, "And since it is more difficult to disbelieve these things than to believe them, let us comply with the custom in outward and public behaviour, and let our hearts be more unpolluted, pure and sober," 612 B. Aet. Rom. 275 E, a religious rite called a σύμβολον of the gods' love of temperance. Cf. Heraclitus, Alleg. Hom. c. 6, mystic doctrines taught by secret religious ceremonies. Demetrius Phal., Walz Rhet. Gr. IX. 47, 101, allegorical form of mysteries for the purpose of inspiring terror and awe, as in darkness and night; for allegory is like darkness and night. See Lobeck, I, 133 foll., 166 foll. Hatch 59. Grote I. 388-392. On Plutarch's rational explanation of traditional religion, Volkmann II., 252 foll.

[185] De Is. 353 E.

[186] 361 D, E. Cf. 351 F. foll., true followers of Isis obtain reason and knowledge; her temple Ἴσεῖον has its name from εἰσομένων τὸ ὄν.

[187] Fr. 26, end. Cf. Plato. Euthyphro 13 C foll., for the negative part of this doctrine, that the gods are not benefited by our service; also Rep. 364 B foll., and Laws 885 B, 888 C. Positive part, aid to man, in Laws 653 and 716.

[188] Wyttenbach, XI. 162, remarks upon Plutarch's probable and reasonable methods of interpretation. Cf. Julian VII. 227 A, praise of Plutarch's myths and explanations of myths.

[189] De Is. 362 A, B. For γλισχρῶς see de aud. po. 31 E and Wyttenbach's notes.

[190] 762 A.

him partial truth that had been perceived by the great men of bygone ages, "theologians, lawgivers, poets, philosophers;" this rational belief that all men had some truth and no man had all truth made it natural for him to cling to tradition and to interpret it as he chose. And it was easy for him to accept different kinds of interpretation of the same story, as we shall see in his explanations of the Isis myth, because nature was one, filled with reflections and similitudes. And so he recognized many causes of religious belief and observance[191] and supposed that sometimes several causes contributed to establish a rite.[192] With his sincere religious convictions his figurative interpretations were necessarily symbolical in their nature; allegorical interpretations in the exact sense, that is, with complete substitution of physical or moral forces for the gods, would be atheism, as he showed in his strictures upon the Stoics. He has himself summed up his belief that myth and rite are only aids to pious thought and life, and that their form in any particular case is unimportant. "Therefore the garments in which the priests of Isis are clothed after death are a symbol that this divine reason dwells with these priests, and that, having this and nothing else, they go to that other life. For neither does a beard or an old cloak make a philosopher, nor do linen and a shaven face make priests of Isis; but he is truly a priest of Isis who accepts according to the religious custom of his country the stories about these gods and the rites in their honor, and at the same time seeks by reason and philosophy the truth that lies hidden in them."[193] "If you have listened to the stories about the gods so as to find the hidden truth in them, and if, with holy and philosophic minds, you receive the myth from those who expound it, and if you perform day by day and zealously guard the sacred rites, but consider that a true belief about the gods is more acceptable to them than any sacrifice or ceremonial, you will escape what is no less an evil than atheism, superstition."[194]

Consequently, "if the Egyptians believe and tell this story (the myth of Isis) as literally true of the blessed and immortal nature, that is to say the divine being, you ought, in the words of Aeschylus, to spew it out and purify your mouth."[195] Plutarch was convinced that the Egyptians did not believe that their myths were literally true; on the contrary, he claimed that they themselves showed that we must "refer all things to reason."[196] We know from

[191] Cf. Review of Farnell's Greek Cults in *The Nation*, 1897, Sept. 2, p. 189.

[192] Cf. de Is. 353 E on four causes of religious customs, and 352 D-F, on three causes of linen dress for priests. Cf. Philo above, p. 22.

[193] De Is. 352 B, C.

[194] 355 C, D.

[195] De Is. 358 E. Cf. Heraclitus Alleg. Hom. c. 1, Homer was most impious if he were not allegorizing. On allegory as a therapeutic to myths see Lobeck I, 155 foll., with citations there given. Cf. Philo above, p. 22.

[196] 378 B. Cf. 378 A, 354 C, 355 B, 379 D foll.; Amat. 762 A (quoted above, p. 30, f. n. 174), seems to imply the same thing. Cf. Oaksmith, 64 foll.

other sources that the Egyptians did not confine themselves to a literal acceptance of their religious tradition, but discovered in it suggestions of higher truths. Therefore it is probable that Plutarch was generally copying the Greek writers on Egyptian religion that had preceded him, the loss of whose works makes it impossible to determine his sources. Moreover, in addition to giving the Egyptian interpretation of myth and rite, these authorities almost certainly exhibited Hellenizing tendencies, that is, they applied to the Egyptian religion the allegorical method already made familiar by the Stoic treatment of Greek myths.[197] However, even if there were little allegorizing in his sources, an author who ascribed to the ancients his own pure religious beliefs would be generous enough to suppose that the Egyptians found some means to "cure" the disagreeable stories of their mythology.

"To refer everything to reason" did not imply that Plutarch considered that human reason is infallible; he was too reverent to believe that men could comprehend all the designs of deity.[198] Nor was it to give a rationalistic explanation, in the modern sense; although one remark about dreams is completely rationalistic: they are, naturally, sometimes true by mere coincidence.[199] And the explanation of the story that the Thessalian witch Aglaonice drew the moon from the sky is rationalistic: her knowledge of astronomy enabled her to foreknow eclipses and so to pretend to occult powers.[200] But with Plutarch "to follow God was to obey reason,"[201] and the real problem of the pious allegorist was to explain the apparently objectionable elements in religious tale and rite so as both to preserve religious doctrine and observance and to free them from all immoral and revolting and terrifying significance,[202] in order to avoid the equally dangerous extremes of superstition and atheism.[203]

Plutarch's method was in one aspect truly historical. He inferred from the circumstances of a religious rite its origin, and thereby explained away what at first sight seemed reprehensible. For exam-

[197] Cf. Iamb. de myst. VII. c. 1 foll. on symbolic character of Egyptian religion. On Egyptian use of allegory see Sallustius de diis c. 4. On Plutarch's sources and on Egyptian figurative interpretation, see below pp. 61-64.

[198] De Pyth. or. 409 D. *ἀδυνάτων ὄντων ἐξικνεῖσθαι τῷ λογισμῷ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ διάνοιαν.* Cf. de sera num. 549 F.

[199] De def. or. 438 A.

[200] Conj. praec. 145 C, D.

[201] De aud. 37 D. Cf. symp. 613 B, philosophy is the art of life.

[202] De Is. 378 D, *πῶς οὖν χρηστέον ἐστὶ ταῖς σκυθρωπαῖς καὶ ἀγελάστοις καὶ πανθήμοις θυσίαις, εἰ μήτε παραλείπειν τὰ νενομισμένα καλῶς ἔχει μήτε φύρειν τὰς περὶ θεῶν δόξας καὶ συνταράττειν ὑποψίαις ἀτόποις;* Cf. Oakesmith 85, "Plutarch's attitude toward the ancient Faith may thus be defined as one of patriotic acceptance modified by philosophic criticism." See all of pp. 85 and 86.

[203] Cf. below p. 35.

ple, he asked how we were to perform the sad and mournful rites prescribed by custom and yet preserve a pious belief in the gods.[204] "The season," said he, "leads us to suspect the true solution, that the grief exhibited as for the death of a god is in reality for the disappearance of the fruits of the earth. As we say that one who has bought the books of Plato has bought Plato, and that Menander is acted when the poems of Menander are represented, so they (the ancients) did not hesitate to call by the names of the gods the gifts and deeds of the gods, honoring and reverencing those gifts by this use. But men who came later received these names unintelligently, and ignorantly converted the life-history of the fruits into experiences of the gods, and not only called the appearances and disappearances of useful plants the births and deaths of gods, but actually held that view, and thus filled themselves with heretical and confusing beliefs. . . . Yet the Egyptians[205] grieve for the fruits, but pray to the gods, the authors and givers, to cause others to spring up in place of those that have perished. Therefore it is excellently said among philosophers[206] that men who do not understand the meaning of words make an ill use of things. too; as some of the Greeks call statues gods, and have the hardihood to say that Lachares pulled down Athena . . . and thus unintentionally accept immoral opinions, the consequences of the words used.[207] The Egyptians suffer this particularly in their worship of animals, for, while the Greeks properly say and understand that certain animals are sacred to certain gods, many of the Egyptians worship the animals themselves as gods. Dangerous beliefs result, and bring the weaker sort into superstition, the bolder into atheism."[208] The teachers of doctrine used language metaphorically: Poets and philosophers used the name of the god more particularly to express the element or force presided over by the god; theologians and lawgivers used the names of the gods for things useful to men, divine gifts, or for the symbols of the deity designated. And yet in this very topic we find Plutarch particularly unhistorical in his criticism of tradition. He assumed that the ancients had a purer religious belief and knew that the fruits of the field were not gods,

[204] Cf. above f. n. 202.

[205] Plutarch has here, according to Parthey, 260, brought Greek conditions to bear upon Egyptian customs, since in Egypt the winter is not severe enough to cause so marked a change in the aspect of vegetable life; cf. 366 C foll., and Parthey's comments upon that passage. These explanations are, therefore, probably Plutarch's own suggestion, at least not derived from any one well acquainted with the climatic conditions of Egypt. In the physical interpretation of the story that Osiris aided Zeus when another divinity rose in revolt against him, although Plutarch says explicitly that the Egyptians called the air Zeus, the expression has too Greek a sound to leave much doubt that it was a Hellene who first suggested this mode of dealing with the myth.

[206] Cf. Plato, Crat. 435 E. for the form of expression; but 436 foll. for the danger of being deceived in things, if we rely upon names that may have been assigned by men who themselves misunderstood the things.

[207] *δόξας πονηρὰς ἐπομένας τοῖς ὀνόμασιν.*

[208] 378 D-379 E. Cf. 355 D and the essay de superst.

but gifts of the gods;[209] that Homer knew that Zeus was not the cause of evil.[210]

This confusion in the use of words was, he thought, one cause of the blame bestowed upon Homer; therefore he maintained that if a student was to be helped and not hurt by Homer, he must understand the exact sense in which a poet has in any special case used words admitting more than one meaning, especially the names for the gods and words for good and evil.[211] For example *οἶκος* is sometimes a house, sometimes property; *βίοτος* sometimes life, sometimes possessions. To come to "greater and more important matters," young men must be taught that the poets used the names of the gods, sometimes having in mind the very gods themselves, sometimes *δυνάμεις τινὰς ὧν οἱ θεοὶ δοτῆρές εἰσι καὶ καθηγεμόνες ὑμωνύμως προσαγορεύοντες*.[212] Thus Hephaestos is fire;[213] Ares war;[214] or a weapon;[215] Zeus fate.[216] In this way, he continued, ought we to correct many things

[209] De Is. 378 F, *χαρπῶν . . . . . οὓς οἱ παλαιοὶ θεοὺς μὲν οὐκ ἐνόμιζον, ἀλλὰ δῶρα θεῶν ἀναγκαῖα καὶ μεγάλα πρὸς τὸ μὴ ζῆν ἀγρίως καὶ ἀηριωδῶς.*

[210] De aud. po. 23 D, *οὐ γὰρ τὸν θεὸν ὁ ποιητὴς οἴεται κακὰ μηχανᾶσθαι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις.*

But, he went on, even fate, for which the name of the god here stands, was not wholly insensible to moral considerations; for cities fall or stand according to the ill or good conduct of their affairs. Fate was not blind, but outside man's powers of calculation, 24 B, *τύχης ἢ τῆς εἱμαρμένης λεγομένων, ἐν αἷς τὸ ἀσυλλόγιστον ἡμῖν τῆς αἰτίας σημαίνεται καὶ ὅλως οὐ καθ' ἡμᾶς.* Against similar modern assumptions of the wisdom of the original mythmakers see Grote, I. 388, 389; Gruppe I. 34 foll. Cf. above p. 26.

[211] De aud. po. 22 D. The topic fills pp. 22C-25D. On the transference of names of gods to the things typified by them see Aristotle in Porph. Hom. Quaest. Il. 2, 447 (Schrader, p. 44, line 29, foll.), and Schrader's comments on the topic, p. 425.

[212] De aud. po. 23 A. Cf. below p. 37 foll.

Lobeck I. 156, says, "This physical explanation of myths was greatly helped by the habit of the natural philosophers of calling the elements by the names of the gods. No example is found in Homer (for the calling war and fire Ares and Hephaestos is a different thing)." Probably Lobeck means that Homer always had a reverent consciousness of the god as giver or director of the natural force, evidently the idea that Plutarch had of this use of the names of gods by such of the ancients as were worthy our belief; the natural philosophers, on the contrary, lost sight of the god in the thing, and were in many cases using the divine names for rhetorical effect.

[213] De aud. po. 23 B.

[214] C.

[215] Il. 7, 329.

[216] 23 D foll.; See Il. 1, 5, and Hes. O. D. 86. Upon the use in O. D. 717 of *μαχάρων* for *τύχης* Plutarch remarks that the "poets had not yet the word *τύχη* but used the name of the god for *τὴν τῆς ἀτάκτως καὶ ἀορίστως περιφερομένης αἰτίας δύναμιν ἰσχυρὰν καὶ ἀφύλακτον οὖσαν ἀνθρωπίνῳ λογισμῷ*, just as we are in the habit of calling things, characters, men divine." So in 26 E Plutarch interprets Athena in Il. 1, 220 as reason.

that seem to be improperly said of Zæus, as Il. 24, 227; 7, 69; Od. 8, 81. But whenever anything is said that is fitting and reasonable and appropriate, there let us suppose that the god himself, *κυρίως*, is named. Compare, "This is the explanation most fitting the gods."[217] Like these figurative uses of the names of the gods was the employment of *ἀρετή* for the worldly reputation or power that a man's virtue helped to bring to him; "just as the fruit of the olive is called an olive, of the fig a fig."[218] So also poets used *κακότης* and *εὐδαιμονία*.[219]

These explanations assume that the poet spoke metaphorically, not, in the strict meaning of the term, allegorically. But they illustrate Plutarch's understanding of the non-literal use of words in the most important subjects. Besides, it is practically impossible to draw a dividing line between metaphor and allegory, and we can never determine how just are Plutarch's censures of the Stoics for atheistic identifications of the gods with moral or physical phenomena. Perhaps they, too, intended to say that the poets made use of *μεταφοραῖς καὶ καταχρήσεσι τῶν ὀνομάτων*.[220] He reproached Chrysippus for his atheistical etymologies: "He derived Ares from *ἀναιρεῖν*, and made of the god nothing but the contentious part of man's soul. Others will say that Aphrodite is desire, Hermes reason, the Muses the arts, and Athena wisdom. You see the abyss of atheism swallowing us up if we transform each of the gods into *πάθη καὶ δυνάμεις καὶ ἀρετάς*."[221] The same warning was given with reference to physical explanations: "Instead of leaving the gods free, as drivers or pilots, the Stoics nail and solder them to the elements as statues to bases, so that they suffer change and destruction."[222] "We must take care that we do not resolve the gods into winds and waves and the seed and fruit of the fields and *πάθη γῆς καὶ μεταβολὰς ὡρῶν*; as Dionysus[223] into wine and Hephaestos into fire; and Cleanthes derives Persephone from *τὸ διὰ τῶν καρπῶν φερόμενον καὶ φονευόμενον πνεῦμα*.[224] Men who do this are like

[217] De Is. 383 A. Cf. Philo, we must allegorize when anything unworthy the divinity is said, Siegfried 162 foll.

[218] De aud. po. 24C-E.

[219] 24 F; 25 A, B.

[220] 25 B. Cf. de Is. and the fr. de daed. Plat. *passim* for this metaphorical explanation of myths and rites, sometimes helped out by etymologies.

[221] Amat. 757 B. In 765 E the *γραμματικοί* are said to have explained the myth that made Iris the mother of Eros as an allegory of the many colored and youthful passion of love, but that speaker who seems to express Plutarch's views dissents from this suggestion. Cf. de aud. po. 31E, objections to etymologies of Cleanthes and Chrysippus.

[222] De def. or. 426 B, C.

[223] When Plutarch in de aud. po. 15 E. refers to the story of Dionysus and Lycurgus as if Dionysus were wine, he was certainly understanding the name as used metaphorically and not really allegorically (Cf. above p. 7 f. n. 7), that is, not with strict identification. Heraclitus Alleg. Hom. 35 and Cornutus 30 consider this story an allegory of wine-making.

[224] Cf. Cornutus c. 28, *ἐκ πόνων .... φέρεσθαι*.

those who fancy the sails and anchor the pilot. But they inculcate dangerous atheistical doctrines when they apply the names of gods to senseless, lifeless, perishable things, which are under the control of man; for it is not possible that men consider such things as these gods."[225]

Moreover, "even the sun has caused nearly all men to ignore Apollo because as a sensible image it has turned the mind from reality to a mere appearance."[226] The true relationship was that of physical counterpart to a spiritual entity.[227] Or, again, the divinity presided over certain departments of mental activity or of the physical world, Ares over the fiery part of our nature, Aphrodite over love.[228] The form of expression in his allegorical explanations often suggests the relationship of the god to the thing: if we allot to Typhon whatever is disorderly in nature, but consider as the work of Isis and the image of Osiris whatever is ordered and good, we shall not go wrong.[229] *θεοὺς ..... περὶ πᾶσαν ἀγαθοῦ μοῖραν ἡγούμεθα τέταχθαι.....πᾶν.....καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν διὰ τούτους ὑπάδχειν·* [230] Horus is the force that presides over the appointed revolution of the sun.[231] The Greeks think that Dionysus is *κύριον καὶ ἀρχηγόν* of all the nature of the moist.[232] They call not only the Nile but in general all the moist an *ἀπορροήν* of Osiris.[233] Typhon was the *δημιουργός* of earthquakes, etc.[234] After various stories about Typhon with physical interpretations Plutarch added, "Hence it would not be unreasonable to say that each story in particular is not true, but that all taken together really teach the truth. For it is not right to say that Typhon is drought, wind, sea, or darkness, but whatever nature holds of the injurious and destructive is the portion of Typhon.[235]

The only genuine extant work of Plutarch that bears directly upon allegoristic is de Iside et Osiride.[236] Even the de audiendis

[225] De Is. 377 D, E. Cf. below f. n. 286.

[226] De Pyth. or. 400 D. Cf. ad princ. iner. 780F and 781F, the sun as an image of god. But Plutarch interpreted some of the epithets of Apollo as really belonging to the sun, de lat. viv. 1130A. They showed the popular belief that Apollo was the sun; the very name of Hades showed the belief that this god was darkness, de lat. viv. 1130A.

[227] De def. or 433 D, E; de E. 393 D foll.

[228] Amat. 757C, D; the language is very suggestive, *Ἄρην κοσμοῦντα.... ἐφορῶν καὶ βραβεύων.....μάρτυς.....ἐπίσκοπος.....ἡγεμὼν ἢ συνεργός.*

[229] De Is. 376 F, 377A.

[230] 377A.

[231] 375 F.

[232] 365 A.

[233] 365 B, 366 A; in the latter the land is called the body of Isis.

[234] 373 D.

[235] 369 A.

[236] De vita et poesi Homeri is generally acknowledged to be spurious. Nor is it a collection of excerpts from Plutarch, but such likeness as exists comes rather from the use of a common source; see Bernardakis Teubner ed. Plut. Mor. VI. praef. XXVIII. The Homeric Exercises is lost. The com. in Hes., so far as it survives, is not allegorical. The comment in de virt. mor. 446 A, B on several verses is not really allegorical interpretation, for

poetis contains only one or two allegorical explanations. The Isis myth, however, is sufficient in itself to show Plutarch's feeling towards religious tradition and to call forth various modes of interpretation. It could not be rejected, for that would unsettle religious faith; for the same reason it could not admit a Euhemeristic explanation; it could not be received literally, for that would be to harbor an abominable superstition; the names of the gods could not be identified with natural phenomena, for that would engender atheism. It contained good and evil beings, and was thus a vehicle for Plutarch's doctrine of two principles in the world. It could be accepted as a true relation of the lives of demons; it could be taken as a symbol of moral and cosmogonical and physical truth.[237] It could be at once a symbol of spiritual and of natural truth, because nature was an image of spiritual being, as the sun of Apollo; and the three classes of intelligent beings—gods, demons, men—were represented by three corresponding classes of heavenly bodies: sun, moon, and comets.[238] Another example of his finding correspondences between the natural and spiritual realms is that the Egyptians called the dog Hermes, not *κυρίως*, but because the philosophic character of the animal typified the most logical of the gods.[239]

After rejecting the myth as an account of the lives of gods or of men, and accepting it as a true history of the lives of demons,[239a] Plutarch passed on[240] to the interpretations of the "more philosophical" students of the story; that is, those who found a deeper thought under the demon myth. His own object in the allegorical interpretation of the Isis myth was 'to fit the Egyptian theology to Plato's philosophy of the origin of the world as developed in the Timaeus."[241] But he admitted any interpretation that did not conflict with his broad spiritual and moral views of religion. His toler-

the poet seems to have explicitly made use of similes, and Plutarch only developed the *εἰκών*. The same may be said of the interpretation of some Pythagorean precepts, sym. 727C foll.; they were, of course, real allegories; cf. word *συμβόλοις* in C.

[237] Cf. Lafaye 6, to the Egyptians this story was "un seul mythe, à la fois métaphysique, naturaliste et moral." Cf. Ruskin, Queen of the Air 8, "In all the most beautiful and enduring myths we shall find, not only a literal story of a real person,—not only a parallel imagery of moral principle,—but an underlying worship of natural phenomena, out of which both have sprung, and in which both forever remain rooted." Plutarch attributes many of his explanations to the Egyptians; it is improbable that any of them were original with him, except, perhaps, the demon theory and a fitting of the myth to the philosophy of the Timaeus.

[238] De def. or. 416 D. On nature as a model for men, see de sera num. 550 D; de am. prol. 493 E. On similar notions among the Stoics, Cic. N. D. II. 14, 37; Tus. IV. 26, 57; de sen. 21, 77.

[239] De Is. 355 B. Plutarch refers to Plato; see Rep. 375 E.

[239a] Cf. above p. 31.

[240] 363 D foll.

[241] 371 A. Heinze, Xenokrates 31-33, gives a brief summary of Plutarch's accommodation of the myth to the Timaeus philosophy. Cf. Parthey VIII., Plutarch probably the first to show the likeness between Plato's metaphysics and Egyptian theology.

ance, and his belief in the universality of the divine forces, both essentially Greek ideas, will appear best from his own words.

363 D.—368 F. Osiris the moist.

"As the Greeks allegorize Cronus into time, and Hera into air, and the birth of Hephaestus into the change of air to fire, so to the Egyptians Osiris is the Nile[242] that fertilizes the land, that is, Isis, and Typhon is the sea, into which the Nile falls and is scattered far and wide, except such part of it as the land retains. And there is a sacred lament for Cronus that celebrates him who is born on the left and dies on the right; for the Egyptians call the north the right and the south the left. So the Nile, which rises in the south and disappears towards the north in the sea, is naturally said to have its birth on the left and its death on the right. Therefore the priests hate the sea and call it the foam of Typhon. And they do not allow salt on their tables, nor greet pilots. And this is not the least reason that they discard fish,[243] and they use the picture of a fish as the hieroglyph of hatred.[244] . . . This is the most common account."

From this simplest form of allegory, Plutarch passes to a higher step:

364 A. "But the wisest of the priests call Osiris and Typhon not only the Nile and the sea, but in general they call Osiris the principle of the moist,[245] for they consider moisture to be the cause of generation and the essence of the seed; but Typhon they called the drought and whatever is opposite to moisture.[246] Therefore they think him red in complexion and avoid men of that appearance. But they say allegorically that Osiris was black, because water makes everything black with which it is mixed. . . . The bull that is worshipped in Heliopolis, called Mneuin, is black, for it is sacred to Osiris. . . .

"And they say that the sun and moon do not travel around in chariots, but in boats; now this is an enigma of their nourishment[247]

[242] Parthey 228 f. n. quotes Lepsius, "In der Goetter procession vor Osiris in Dendea ist eine der ersten Figuren der libirende Nil-gott."

[243] Cf. Sym. 729 B on the dislike of the Pythagoreans for fish, "The Nile, the deflux of Osiris, perishes in the sea, and when they mourn for Osiris as born on the left, etc."

[244] See below p. 63.

[245] Cf. Sallustius de diis c. 4, Isis land, Osiris the moist, Typhon heat; or Cronos water, Adonis fruits, Dionysus wine.

[246] Cf. de prim. frig. 950 E., Homer, more like a natural philosopher than a poet, opposed Hephaestos to the river and Apollo to Poseidon. Cf. Heraclitus above, p. 22.

Not unlike these interpretations of the Isis myth that make the story a recital of the opposition of physical forces are some modern explanations of the Beowulf myth. Muellenhoff, Beowulf 1 foll., says that Beowulf is the sun and summer overcoming the wildness and destructiveness of the sea. Cf. Thos. Arnold, Notes on Beowulf, ch. 9.

[247] Cf. 355 B, the picturing of the sun as a young child on a lotus flower is a symbol of sunrise and of the sun's nourishment by moisture. In de Pyth. or. 399 F foll. Plutarch ridicules the Stoics for explaining the frogs and water

and birth from the moist. They think that Homer[248] as well as Thales had learnt from the Egyptians that water is the source of all things; the ocean is Osiris and Tethys is Isis, the nurse, τιθηνουμένην, of all things. The Greeks call . . . Dionysus the rainer, ὄμβριον, as lord of the moist nature, and he is none other than Osiris; for Hellanicus seems to have heard Osiris called by the priests Hysiris.

"Proof that Osiris is the same as Dionysus . . . may be drawn from the burial rites of Apis which strikingly resemble Bacchic exercises. . . . Moreover, the stories of Dionysus and the Titans[249] agree with the discerptions and palingenesis of Osiris; and the stories of their tombs are similar . . . That the Greeks believe Dionysus the lord not only of wine but of the moist in general Pindar[250] is a sufficient witness when he says,

> 'May joyous Bacchus send increase of fruit,
> The chaste autumnal light, to all my trees.'

For this reason the worshipers of Osiris also are forbidden to destroy a cultivated tree and to stop up a spring.

"A proof that they call not only the Nile but in general all the moist an efflux of Osiris is their custom of carrying a water pitcher in the processions in honor of this god. A fig leaf is the hieroglyph for both king and the south,[251] because it is the symbol of fruitfulness. This character of fruitfulness of the god is shown by various rites in his honor and by various details of the myth. And there is another Egyptian story according to which Apopis the brother of the Sun made war against Zeus; after Zeus had conquered by the aid of Osiris he adopted Osiris and called him Dionysus. This tale touches upon physical truth, for the Egyptians call the air Zeus,[252]

snakes around an offering to Apollo as typifying the nourishment of the sun by moisture. His own interpretation was that they stood for spring, when the sun renewed his strength. There is no real contradiction, for in de Isis Plutarch is confessedly giving the interpretations of others, often explicitly of the Egyptian priests. In de Pyth. or. he is less serious, and the subject is less serious, merely an artist's conceit instead of religious ideas earnestly held by a large number of people.

[248] Il. 14, 201.

[249] Cf. de esu. carn. I. 996, the sufferings of Dionysus and the violent deeds of the Titans against him seem to have been an enigma of palingenesis; for the unreasonable and violent and disorderly part of our soul, which is not divine but is demonic, the ancients called τιτᾶνας, that is punished, and paying a penalty (cf. τίνουσαι in the same passage a few lines above). Just above this passage Plutarch had said that Empedocles wrote an allegory of the soul's incorporation into a body as a punishment for its misdeeds, but, as the verse seems to have fallen out, we cannot determine whether Plutarch has forced this meaning upon the author or whether the poet really wrote an allegory. Cf. Plato, Crat. 400 C, this idea of incorporation as a punishment is an Orphic doctrine. Cf. also, the Circe myth was an αἴνιγμα of metempsychosis, fr. inc. 146 from Stobaeus eclog. 1046. For Bernardakis's reasons for assigning this fragment to Plutarch see Vol. VII. Praef. of his edition.

[250] Fr. in Bergk. 1 p. 433.

[251] See below 63.

[252] One of the speakers in de fac. Lun. 940 A says that Zeus in Alcman's

hostile to which is the drought; this latter is not the sun, but is akin to the sun; and moisture, by quenching the excessive dryness, increases the exhalations that feed the air.

"Another proof of the identity of Dionysus and Osiris is the Egyptian name for ivy, chenosiris,[253] which signifies, as they say, the plant of Osiris . . .

365 F. "They suppose that the star Sirius belongs to Isis, because it brings on the high water. And they honor the lion and adorn the entrances to the temples with lions' heads because the Nile rises when the sun enters the zodiac sign Leo. Just as they consider the Nile an efflux of Osiris so they hold that the body of Isis is the land, but not all of it; only so much as the Nile fertilizes. And from this union of Osiris and Isis is born Horus. Now Horus is that salutary season and mixture of air that they say is nourished by Leto in the marshes about Buto; for the rain-soaked earth best produces those exhalations that quench the dryness of the air. And they call by the name Nephthys those parts of the land that are farthest from the Nile or that touch upon the sea; therefore they name Nephthys the End and say that she is the wife of Typhon. But when the Nile has an excessive overflow and approaches the outlying lands, this they call the intercourse of Osiris with Nephthys, that becomes manifest by the plants that then spring up there; one of these plants is the melilot, by which the myth says that Typhon discovered the injury done his bed. On this account also Isis bore Horus in wedlock, but Nephthys gave birth to the bastard Anubis. In the annals of the kings they write that Nephthys the wife of Typhon was at first barren; if they say this not of a woman but of a goddess it is an enigma of the desert parts of the earth.

"The conspiracy and rule of Typhon was the power of drought that overcame and scattered the moisture that produces and increases the Nile. His ally, the queen of the Ethiopians, is an enigma of the south winds that blow from Ethiopia; for when they overcome the clouds that the Etesian winds carry towards Ethiopia, and prevent the rainfall that increases the Nile, Typhon flames up irresistibly, and shutting the Nile up in its channel thrusts the stream now become weak and small into the sea. The story that Osiris was enclosed in a box seems to be nothing but an enigma of the subsidence of the water. Therefore they say that Osiris disappeared in the month Athyr when the Etesian winds fail and the Nile returns to its bed and the land becomes bare; as the night lengthens and darkness increases and the light grows feeble, the priests perform dark and sad rites; one of these is to cover a cow with a pall in sorrow for the goddess (for they consider the cow as well as the

verse *Διὸς θυγάτηρ Ἔρσα τρέφει καὶ δίας Σελάνας* was the air. Same verse and same interpretation in sym. 659 B, C. Cf. Aet. Rom. 40, Zeus the air. But 77, Zeus the sun and Hera the moon.

[253] See below p. 63.

land an image of Isis.) These ceremonies last four days beginning at the seventeenth, for they grieve for four things, the subsidence of the Nile, the cessation of the north winds before the blasts of the south winds, the shortness of the day, and the bareness of the earth accompanied by the falling of the leaves. On the nineteenth they go down to the sea by night, and carry with them in the sacred chest a little golden box; into this they pour potable water, and raise a shout that Osiris is found. Then they stir into the water fruitful earth and precious perfumes, and form a moon-shaped image, which they dress and adorn. By these rites they show that they consider these gods to be the essence of earth and water.

367A. "But when Isis had again received Osiris and had nurtured Horus, now grown strong by exhalations and mists and clouds, Typhon was subdued but not destroyed; for the mistress of the earth did not permit the principle opposite to the moist to be utterly destroyed, but only restrained, since she wished the mixture to remain; for the world would not be complete without the fiery substance. If these explanations are not reasonable, neither would one reasonably reject that story of Typhon's ancient rule over Osiris's kingdom; for Egypt used to be sea; in proof of this, even now may be seen many fossil seashells and the many springs and wells have a brackish flavor, as if the sea had left some remnant of itself. But in time Horus conquered Typhon, that is, when a rainy season came the Nile thrust out the sea and showed the dry land and enlarged it by deposits. What we even now see is a proof of this; for as the river brings down new mud and carries forward the land it forces the sea to retreat before the deposits that fill up the deeps of the water. . . . These interpretations are like the theological beliefs of the Stoics; for they say that Dionysus is the fertilizing and nourishing air, Heracles the violent and disturbing air, Ammon the receptive, Demeter and Core the air that goes through the earth and the fruits of the earth, Poseidon the air that goes through the sea."

367 C—368 F. Osiris the Moon, Typhon the Sun.

"The interpreters who join to these physical explanations some astronomical principles think that the world of the sun is called Typhon, that of the moon Osiris. For the light of the moon is productive and brings rain, and is propitious to the birth of animals and the sprouting of plants; but by its fierce light the sun burns and dries up the growing things, and renders the greater part of the earth uninhabitable by its hot flame and often subdues the moon. Therefore the Egyptians always call Typhon Seth [Set], which is the force that overmasters and compels by violence. And they recount in their myths that Heracles sits in the sun and is carried around with it, but that Hermes sits in the moon; for the motions of the moon are like the deeds of reason and of remarkable wisdom, but the motions of the sun are like strokes that violently

extend beyond proper limits. And the Stoics say that the sun is lighted and fed by the sea, but that the fresh springs and lakes send up to the moon a pleasant and mild exhalation.

"The Egyptians have it in their stories that the death of Osiris fell upon the seventeenth, the day on which the full moon appears. . . . . Some say that Osiris lived twenty-eight years, others that he ruled twenty-eight years; for this is the number of the days of the moon. In the ceremonies called the burial of Osiris they fashion a box in a crescent shape, because when the moon approaches the sun it assumes this shape at the moment of its disappearance. They employ the discerption of Osiris into fourteen parts as an enigma of the number of days in which the moon wanes. . . .

"Moreover, they think that the rising of the Nile has some relation to the days of the moon; for the greatest height, which happens at Elephantine, is twenty-eight cubits, the measure of the moon's course; and that its lowest rise is six cubits at Mendes and Xois, the measure of the half moon; and its middle height is usually fourteen cubits at Memphis, which corresponds to the days up to the full moon. The birth of Apis, an animate image of Osiris, takes place when a fruitful light falls from the moon upon the cow. Therefore many things about Apis bear a resemblance to the form of the moon, for Apis has light and dark colors. Furthermore, on the new moon of Phamenoth they celebrate a feast, which they call the entrance of Osiris into the moon, and this is the beginning of spring. As they place the power of Osiris in the moon so they say that Isis, that is, generation, dwells with him. Therefore they call the moon the mother of the world, and think that it has both the male and the female natures, since it receives fertilization from the sun and then sends forth life-giving principles. For the Typhonian destruction does not always prevail, but is often overpowered and bound by generation, then is released and contends with Horus again. . . .

368 D. "And some make the myth an enigma of the eclipses. For when the moon is at the full, that is, is opposite the sun, it is eclipsed by falling into the shadow of the earth, as they say that Osiris fell into the box. And in turn the moon itself hides the sun but not completely, as Isis did not destroy Typhon. After Nephthys had borne Anubis Isis adopted him, for Nephthys is the hidden parts of the world that lie below the horizon, but Isis is the part that is above the earth and in plain view. But the circle that touches both and is called the horizon is common to both, and has been named Anubis and is likened in its form to the dog; for the dog sees equally by night and day. Anubis seems to have the same character among the Egyptians as Hecate has among the Greeks, that is, they are at once Olympian and under-world deities. But to some Anubis seems to be Cronus; therefore, since Cronus produced all things from himself, the dog took his name κύων, from this fact. . . . To sum up the whole matter, it may be said that no

individual interpreter is right, but that all together are right. For it is not right to say that drought or wind or sea or darkness is the portion of Typhon, but whatever in nature is injurious and destructive."

369 A-371A. Here intervenes a discussion of the double cause of the world, a good and an evil, closing with a statement of Plato's philosophy of the genesis of the world, "to which it is the purpose of this book to fit Egyptian theology."

371A—372E. In general, both moral and physical.

"For the genesis and constitution of this world are developed from two opposite principles, which are not equal in strength, but the better is stronger; yet it is impossible to do away utterly with evil, for it is closely bound up with the body and with the soul of the universe and always fights against the better principle. Therefore in the soul, mind and reason[254] and that part that is lord of all the best instincts is Osiris; and in the earth and air and water and heavens and stars that which is orderly and wholesome in seasons and motions is an efflux and image of Osiris. On the other hand Typhon is that part of the soul that is passionate and titanic and unreasonable and unstable; and of the material world that which is perishable and diseased and unstable, as manifest in bad seasons and eclipses, is as it were the flights and disappearances of Typhon; and his name Seth is significant, for it sometimes means violent and sometimes frequent retreat and again victory. Some say that Bebon was one of Typhon's companions, but Manetho says that Typhon himself is called Bebon; this name signifies restraint and prevention; and is used to show that Typhon stands in the way of the right development and course of things. Therefore, they assign to him of domestic animals the stupidest, the ass;[255] of wild animals the most brutal, the crocodile and the hippopotamus. . . . In Hermopolis they show a statue of Typhon in the form of a hippopotamus, upon which has alighted a hawk contending with a snake; by the hippopotamus they indicate Typhon, and by the hawk power and rule; Typhon often comes into possession of this power through violence and then does not cease from troubling both himself and others. . . . Thus they make all bad and injurious animals and plants and passions the works and portion and activity of Typhon.

"Osiris, however, they represented by an eye and a scepter,[256] the former setting forth his providence, the latter his power. . . . And they often used the hawk[257] as a hieroglyph of this god; for it

[254] Cf. 351 F., Osiris was true doctrine which Typhon scattered and Isis gathered again, inviting her followers to join her in the search. Isis was the god of knowledge, which her very name showed, from *εἰδέναι*; Typhon the god of ignorance, as his name showed, *ὅτ' ἄγνοιαν καὶ ἀπάτην τετυφωμένος*.

[255] Cf. 363 C.

[256] See below p. 63.

[257] See below p. 63.

is said that the hawk is remarkable for keenness of vision and swiftness of flight, and needs very little food. . . . They deck the images of Osiris with flame-colored garments, as evidence of their belief that the sun is a sensible body of the essence of good that is perceptible only to the mind.[258] Therefore we must reject the idea that the sphere of the sun belongs to Typhon, to whom belongs nothing shining nor salutary, nor any orderliness nor generation, nor motion that possesses measure and proportion, but all things opposite to these; and drought, which destroys many animals and plants, must not be set down to the account of the sun, but of those winds and waters in the earth and air which are unseasonable and which arise when the principle of unruly and undefined power quenches the exhalations. And they sing of Osiris as hidden in the arms of the sun, and celebrate the birthdays of the eyes of Horus when the moon and sun are in a straight line and thereby show their belief that not only the moon but also the sun is the eye and light of Horus. . . . The ceremony of driving a cow around the temple at the winter solstice is called the search for Osiris, because in the winter the goddess longs for the water of the sun. . . . There are some who say plainly that Osiris is the sun[259] and is called Sirius by the Greeks, although the prefixing of the article on the part of the Egyptians has caused confusion about the name; and that Isis is the moon; therefore the horned images of her are imitations of the crescent, and the dark draperies refer to the overshadowings of the moon when she pursues and longs for the sun. . . . In this view there is something plausible, but those who make Typhon the sun do not deserve to be listened to. However, we must return to our own thesis."

372 E. Plutarch's own interpretation. Metaphysical.

"Now Isis is the female[260] in nature, and receives all generation and is therefore called by Plato[261] the nurse and all-receiver, but by most men the many-named,[262] because under the influence of reason she receives all forms.[263] And she has an inborn affection for the first principle of all things, which is the same as the good, and she longs for and pursues it.[264] On the other hand she flees the evil principle and thrusts it away, although she is space and matter for both; however, she always inclines to the better and freely offers herself to it for the reception of its effluxes and for the reproduction of its likenesses, in which she rejoices. For generation is an

[258] Cf. above p. 38. Cf. Plato. Rep. 508D foll.

[259] Cf. Eusebius Praep. Ev. 1. 9. 1-4, Osiris the sun and Isis the moon.

[260] Plato, Tim. 50 D, 51 A.

[261] 49A. Plutarch's metaphysical allegory is based upon the Timaeus 49 foll.

[262] Cf. Roscher, Lex. d. Gr. u. Roem. Myth. II. I, p. 546, 547.

[263] Idea frequent in Timaeus, but see especially 50A, D, E.

[264] Cf. amat. 770B, matter longs for the principle of motion.

image of true being presented in matter, and that which is born is an imitation of that which always exists.[205]

"Therefore they do not improperly recount in the myth that the soul of Osiris is imperishable, but that Typhon often tears asunder and hides his body, while Isis wanders about until she has found and fitted together the parts. For that which is really existent and is perceptible to reason and is the good is above destruction and change; but the images that the sensible and bodily portion of the universe, when it has assumed logical relations and forms and likenesses, moulds from this truly existent as a model are no more abiding than seals made in wax,[206] but they are seized upon by the spirit of disorder when it has been driven out of the upper region and is hostile to Horus, whom Isis bore as a sensible image of the ideal world.[207] Therefore it is pertinently said that he was indicted by Typhon for bastardy, since he is not pure like his father, who is reason itself unmixed and unaffected by passion and change, but is a hybrid thing on account of his admixture of matter.[208] He, however, triumphs, because Hermes, that is reason, testifies in his behalf and proves that when nature has been brought into relation to the ideal she produces the world. For the birth of Apollo from Isis and Osiris while they were yet in Rhea's womb is an enigma that before this world was generated and matter was perfected by reason, nature was proved to be incomplete by herself[209] and brought forth the first creation imperfect. Therefore they say that that god was born deformed on account of the darkness, and they call him the elder Horus, for he was not the world, but a sort of image and phantasm of the world that was to be.

"But this Horus is himself the defined and complete world, who has not utterly destroyed Typhon, but has taken away his excessive power and strength. . . . They fable that Hermes took out Typhon's muscles and used them as harp-strings, and thus teach that reason by means of harmony made a symphonious universe out of dissonant parts, and did not destroy but weakened the destructive principle. And so it happens that this power is weakened it is true, but exists bound up with the passionate and mutable parts of the world, and is the creator of earthquakes, droughts, unseasonable winds, hurricanes and thunder storms. And it poisons water and air, and sends its influence even up to the moon, the light of which it often disturbs and darkens, as the Egyptians believe when they say that at one time Typhon struck Horus on the eye, at another swallowed his eye, then again gave it back to the sun; the blow on the eye is an enigma of the monthly waning of the moon, the blind-

[205] Plato, Tim. 48E, 49A. Cf. 27 D foll.; 37C.
[206] Ib. 50 E, 51 A.
[207] Ib. 50 D.
[208] Cf. de an. proc. 1026 C, Horus had his spirit from his father his body from his mother.
[209] Plato, Tim. 53 A.

ing of Horus is an enigma of the eclipse, which is healed by the sun when the moon has escaped from the shadow of the earth and again receives the light of the sun."

373 E. Metaphysical again.

"The nobler and diviner nature consists of three parts, the intelligible, matter, and that which comes from a union of these two, what the Greeks call the world. So Plato calls the intelligible 'idea' and 'pattern' and 'father'; matter he calls 'mother' and 'nurse' and the 'place of generation'; their offspring he was accustomed to call 'generation.'[270] One might conjecture that the Egyptians compare the nature of the universe to the fairest of triangles, as Plato in the Republic[271] seems to have used this triangle for a diagram of marriage. This triangle has its perpendicular equal to three, its base to four, and its hypothenuse to five. The perpendicular represents the male, the base the female, the hypothenuse their offspring; that is, Osiris the first principle, Isis the matrix, Horus the completed world. For three is the first odd number and is perfect; four is a square that has an even number, two, for its side; five is in some respects like each parent, for it is the sum of three and two. And the word for all πάντα is a paronym of the word five πέντε, and πεμπάσασθαι is used for to count. Moreover the square of five gives the number of letters in the Egyptian alphabet, and the length of Apis's life.[272] Now they are accustomed to call Horus Min, which is 'seen'; for the world is sensible and visible. And Isis sometimes goes by the name of Muth,[273] that is, 'mother'; sometimes by Athyri,[273] that is, the 'worldly house of Horus,' in the same way that Plato spoke of matter as the space that received generation;[274] sometimes by Methyer, which is a compound of two words signifying 'the full' and 'the cause;' for matter is filled with the world and consorts with the good and pure and orderly element."

374 C. Hesiod and Plato.

"It might perhaps seem that Hesiod understood these same elements when he made the first principles chaos and earth and tartarus and love, if we understand by earth Isis, by love Osiris, by tartarus Typhon; for chaos seems to be space in the broadest sense, that is, assumed as the abiding place of the universe. These accounts call to mind the myth of Plato which Socrates relates in the Symposium[275] about the birth of Love, when he said that Poverty desired children and so lay down beside Plenty, to whom she bore Love; so Love was of mixed nature since he was the offspring of a

[270] Ib. 50 C, D. Cf. 48 E; 49 B; 51 A; 52 A, D; 27 D foll.
[271] 546.
[272] See Appendix I, Plutarch's treatment of number.
[273] See below p. 63.
[274] Cf. above f. n. 270.
[275] 203 B foll.

good, wise and self-sufficient father, but of an indigent mother, who, on account of her own lack, always looked to another. For Plenty is none other than that which was first beloved and longed for, complete in himself; but he called matter Poverty, because of herself she was in want of the good but becomes impregnated with it and is always longing for it and partaking of it. And Horus, or the world, that is born of these two is not immortal, not impassible nor incorruptible, but because he is always becoming he contrives by means of the changes in the accidents that befall him and by various periods of existence to remain ever young[276] and never to approach extinction. . .

374E. "However, we are not to employ myths as direct statements of fact, but to get from them the truth that they teach by means of metaphors. When therefore we utter the word 'matter,' or material, you must not have in mind the soulless and unqualified body designated by this term in some systems of philosophy; for we call oil the 'material' of a perfume, gold of a statue,[277] but do not mean that these things are devoid of all quality of their own. And the soul itself of man as the 'material' of knowledge and virtue we can adorn and harmonize by reason; and some have designated the mind as the place of the ideas and a sort of matrix for the intelligible forms; and some are of the opinion that the generative seed of the woman is not a power or principle, but 'material' and nourishment for generation. Now, holding these uses of the word in mind we ought to think in like manner of this goddess; and that she has some share in the first god,[278] and is ever taken up with love of his excellencies and beauties; that she is not a principle opposite to him but that her love is a right one like that of a law-abiding and righteous man, or as we say that a good woman who is married yet has desire towards her husband, so this goddess is always longing for that first principle although she is filled with his most essential and purest parts. But when Typhon touches upon her extreme parts then she appears sad of countenance and is said to grieve and to gather up the scattered fragments of Osiris and to care for them; that is, matter receives back into itself whatever has perished and hides it, with the intention of again bringing it to birth.[279] Some effluxes of the god, such as appear in the heavens and stars, are abiding, but others are subject to accident, such as appear in the land, sea, plants, animals; these latter are dissolved and destroyed and buried, and again often come to view by means of generation. Therefore the story says that Nephthys is the wife of Typhon, but that Osiris went to her secretly, for the extreme parts of matter, which they call Nephthys and the End, are especially under the

[276] Cf. Plato Tim. 33 A.
[277] On perfume cf. Plato, Tim. 50 E, on gold 50 A, though the similes are not used for exactly the same purpose.
[278] Ib. 51 A.
[279] Ib. 49 E, 52 A.

dominion of the destructive principle; but the principle of fruitfulness and health gives to these parts but a feeble seed, that is destroyed by Typhon, except what Isis gets possession of and preserves and nourishes.

"In a word the son[280] is that which is better, as Plato and Aristotle suspect. And the fruitful and salutary part of nature inclines towards him and towards being, the destructive and injurious away from him and towards non-being. Therefore they give Isis her name from the roots of the words ἴεσθαι and ἐπιστήμη[281] because she is animate and intelligent motion. For the name is not foreign, but as all the gods have a common name, θεοί, from two letters of θεατής and θέων, that is, one who sees and one who runs, so both Greeks and Egyptians call this goddess Isis from science and motion. . . . Osiris has got his name as a compound of ὅσιος and ἱερός, for he is the common idea of things in heaven and things in Hades, the former of which it was the custom of the ancients to call ἱερά, the latter ὅσια.. However, we should not be over-contentious on the subject of names, but I am inclined to consider Osiris of Greek origin.[282]

376 A. "Similar to these Greek derivations are some Egyptian stories and names. For they often call Isis by the name of Athena which signifies, 'I am come from myself'; this testifies that Isis is self-moving impulse. But Typhon, as has been said, is called Seth and Bebon and Smy, names which mean violence and restraint and opposition and overturning. And again they called the magnet the bone of Horus, as Manetho relates, but iron the bone of Typhon; for just as iron is often drawn towards the magnet and again flies off from it, so the salutary and good and reasonable motion in the world draws to itself and by persuasion renders softer the power that is stubborn and Typhon-like, but again the latter retreats and is plunged into disorder. Eudoxus says that the Egyptians tell a myth of Zeus that at first he could not walk because his legs were grown together, and therefore out of shame he lived in the desert. But Isis separated his limbs and thus gave him facility in walking. The myth is an enigma that the mind and reason of the god is in the unseen until it comes into generation by the power of motion.

"The sistrum shows that whatever exists ought to be shaken, σείεσθαι, and never cease from movement, but should be roused and agitated as if it were asleep and its life quenched. For they say that by the sistrum they drive Typhon away; by this they set forth that destruction binds and halts, but by means of movement

[280] Reading instead of οὗτος, ὁ υἱός, as Bernardakis suggests.

[281] Cf. 351 F. Ruskin is guilty of the same lack of logic in accepting two etymologies of the same word, Queen of the Air, p. 41, Argeiphontes is both shining white, and Argos-slayer.

[282] Plutarch recognized the absurdity of deriving really foreign words from the Greek language. He defended his own procedure by claiming that these were truly Greek words, among the vast number that had been carried abroad by the Greeks who had moved to other countries, de Is. 375 F.

generation frees nature. The upper disc of the sistrum contains the four bodies to be shaken. For the part of the world subject to generation and destruction is enclosed by the sphere of the moon, and within that sphere everything is moved and transformed throughout the range of the four elements, fire, earth, water and air.[283] Just below the apex they carve a cat with a human face and below the rattles on one side the face of Isis, on the other the face of Nephthys, using these faces as an enigma of birth and death (for these are the changes and motions of the elements); by the cat they signify the moon, on account of the various colors, the night-prowling, and the fertility of this animal. For it is said to bring forth one kitten, then two, then three, then four, then five, then six, then seven, so that its offspring are twenty-eight in all, the number of the days of the moon. However, this is, perhaps, too fabulous; but the pupils of its eyes seem to dilate at the full moon, and to contract when the moon wanes. By the human face of the cat they show forth the rational method of the changes of the moon."

376 F-382 C. Digression. 376 F-378 B. Physical allegoristic.

"In a word, we are not to conceive Osiris or Isis as water or sun or land or the heavens, nor Typhon as fire or drought or sea; but if we assign to Typhon simply whatever in these various parts of nature is indeterminate and disproportionate on account of excess or lack, and on the other hand if we do honor to whatever is orderly and good and beneficial as the work of Isis and the image and reason of Osiris, we should not be wrong. . . . For we believe that these gods have been set over all the portion of the good, and that all that is fair and good in nature comes into being through them, when the one supplies the original seed and the other receives and nourishes it.

"This belief that these gods are the creators and directors of whatever is helpful to man gives us an explanation to make to those who fit the stories about these gods to the changes of the seasons or to the planting and cultivation of the fruits of the earth, saying that Osiris is buried when the seed is put into the earth, and that he lives again when the plants start to grow. In the same spirit they say that when Isis perceived that she was pregnant she hung a charm around her neck on the sixth day of the month Phaophi; and that the imperfect child Harpocration was brought forth at the winter solstice; that is, the first shoots are tender and undeveloped. . . . Men take delight in these physical interpretations and accept them, because physical phenomena are so evident and usual that they render plausible any explanation that introduces them."

377 C. Warnings.

"And there is no harm in this method, if in the first place its

[283] Cf. Plato, Tim. 49 B foll., 53 A.

advocates allow us to keep these gods universal and do not restrict them to the Egyptians, confining these names to the Nile and the land that is watered by the Nile, and so by calling them marshes or lotuses take away mighty divinities from the rest of mankind, who have no Nile nor Buto nor Memphis. . . . The second danger is more serious, and they ought to be very careful that they do not unintentionally resolve divine powers into physical phenomena. . ."

For the rest of this passage see above pp. 37, 38 and 25 f. n. 142.

Thus it is plain that, within certain restrictions, Plutarch had no objection to physical allegoristic. It is true that he twice explicitly preferred a moral interpretation. In Septem 156 C he does not give an allegorical interpretation, but objects to confining the Muses, Aphrodite and Dionysus to the bare direction of physical things; they presided over moral phenomena, and used the physical merely as instruments. In de aud. po. 19 he claims that for the stories of the adultery of Ares and Aphrodite[284] and of the coquetry or Hera[285] the poet himself had given the *λύσεις*, Aphrodite stood for bad manners and bad morals, and Hera's discomfiture should serve as a warning against the employment of such arts. What he protested against was forced and unnatural allegories:

οὓς [μύθους] ταῖς πάλαι μὲν ὑπονοίαις ἀλληγορίαις δὲ νῦν λεγομέναις, παραβιοζόμενοι καὶ διαστρέφοντες.[286]

[284] Cf. Heraclitus, Allèg. Hom. c. 69, this is an allegory of Empedoclean cosmogony. And Cornutus, 19, 102, Ares equals iron and Aphrodite the softening force of fire; it was called adultery because the warlike and violent is not naturally fitted to the beneficial and pleasing.

[285] Cf. Heraclitus Alleg. Hom. c. 39.

[286] De aud. po. 19 E foll. The words *ὑπόνοια* and *ἀλληγορία* are interesting; but the former always had a much wider application than the latter; for example, in de Is. 363 D *ὑπόνοια* is not an allegory. This passage has been relied upon to prove that Plutarch rejected physical allegorical interpretation, and was opposed to Stoic methods. Wyttenbach, XI p. 161. Wyttenbach makes a reference to Longinus de subl. 9, as saying that only by allegory can Homer be vindicated from the charge of impiety. But in 9, § 8, Longinus uses Plutarch's method of turning from an evil passage to a good, cf. above p. 28 f. n. 163. So it is probable that the two writers were not much at variance upon this point. Cf. on Plutarch's attitude towards physical allegoristic P. Decharme, Un. fragm. d. Daed. de Plut., Mélanges Henri Weil, 114. Westerwick, de Plut. Stud. Hes. 54. Volkmann I. 120. Schlemm 36, 38; the latter page on this passage. Oakesmith XVII-XX., Plutarch an eclectic, rather than a Platonist, and received much from the Stoics and Epicureans. Westerwick, pp. 54-56, says of Plutarch that he sometimes admits physical interpretations and sometimes rejects them, giving de Is. 377 D, E as a proof that he sometimes rejected them. But this is no more rejection of the physical than the passage from amat. 757 B, quoted above p. 37 is of the psychological allegoristic. It is here, as there, a warning. Hirzel, Der Dialog. II. 218, probably has this passage in mind when he says that Plutarch here (de Is.) discards the physical interpretation of the Stoics. On the ground that Plutarch did not admit this Stoic interpretation Hirzel does not allow the physical explanations in the fragment of the Daedala in Plataea to be Plutarch's own; the work must have been a dialogue, and the parts preserved the words of a Stoic interlocutor. The same view of the fragment is held by Decharme, p. 111-116. But Decharme says that Plutarch repudiated physical allegory and took nothing from the Stoics. We have seen that this is not the case. Therefore it does not seem impossible that these words in the daed. in Plat. were a part of the treatment of the subject in which Plutarch wished to show

378A. "For our guide in the interpretation of religious tradition we must use our reason after it has been trained by the study of philosophy. . . . We can gather from the Egyptians themselves that all things should be referred to reason. For when they hold a feast in honor of Hermes they eat honey and the fig, and say, 'Sweet is truth.' The amulet that Isis wore is interpreted 'true speech.' Harpocrates is not to be considered an imperfect and infant god, nor the god of pulse, but the guardian and director of man's childish and imperfect and disjointed conception of the gods; therefore he has his finger on his mouth as a symbol of restraint and silence; and when they bring pulse as a sacrifice to this god they say, 'The tongue is fortune, the tongue is a divinity.' Of all the plants in Egypt they say that the persea is most sacred to the goddess, because its seed is like a heart, its leaf like a tongue. For none of man's possessions is more divine than speech, especially speech about the gods, nor has greater weight in the scale of happiness."

For the next two chapters on mournful rites, and the explanation that they are for the disappearance of fruits and plants, and on the danger in failing to grasp the exact sense in which words are used see above p. 35 foll.

379 E-382 A. Animal worship.

"The explanation of the worship of certain animals because the gods through fear of Typhon had fled into those animals is utterly preposterous. Equally incredible is the hypothesis that these animals alone receive such souls as suffer metempsychosis. There are three theories of a political origin of the custom. According to one theory Osiris had divided his great army into many divisions and had appointed for each division a standard in the form of some animal, and that animal was held sacred by the members of the tribe or division. According to another, later kings had exhibited gold and silver animal heads in front of the army to frighten the enemy. The third theory is that one of the terrible and wicked kings observed that the Egyptians were prone to revolution, and so long as they were united were irresistible by reason of their numbers. Therefore he sowed among them an undying superstition of such a form as to be a cause of perpetual contention. For he ordered some cities to honor and worship certain animals, and other cities to worship other animals, choosing such animals as made war on each other, and of which some were the natural food of others; now the people defended their own sacred animals and were angry when they were hurt, and thus were unconsciously drawn into the hostilities of the animals and fought with each other. . .

that physical allegory might be present. The safeguards and warnings and delimitations are lacking, but the language of the seventh paragraph is not unlike that of the physical explanation of the Isis myth, 363 D, 364 A. Doubtless Hirzel and Decharme would leave the second paragraph to Plutarch, for there a moral explanation is given, see below p. 57.

380C. "By the explanation commonly given, that the soul of Typhon himself has fled into these animals, the myth would seem to be an enigma that every irrational and brutal nature belongs to the dominion of the evil demon, and that they worship these animals in the hope of mollifying him; and if he comes upon them with excessive droughts or deadly sicknesses or other disasters, the priests take some of the sacred animals away under cover of darkness and silence and threaten and frighten them; then if the misfortune continues they kill the animal as a sort of punishment of the demon or purification in time of great trouble. . .

380F. "There are still two causes of the worship of animals, their usefulness[287] and their symbolism;[288] one cause operates in some cases, the other in others, while in many both are present. . . . The asp and weasel and beetle have in them certain images of divine power, just as the sun is reflected in drops of water. The method of reproduction of the weasel is thought to be a likeness of the birth of the reasoning faculty; the beetle has no female, but the males deposit the generative seed in round pellets of earth which they thrust backwards as they move, just as the sun, passing from sunset to sunrise, seems to turn the heavens in the opposite direction; the asp is like a star in never growing old and in swift motion without any organs of motion. Nor has the crocodile honor without plausible reason, but is called an image of god, for it alone is tongueless. For divine thought has no need of a voice, and 'moving along a silent path guides human affairs with justice.' Besides, they say that this is the only water animal with a transparent membrane coming down from its forehead over its eyes, so that it sees without being seen, something that belongs to the first god. . . . It lays sixty eggs, they take sixty days to hatch, and it lives sixty years at most, now this is the number first used in measurements of the movements of the heavenly bodies. . . The ibis makes an equilateral triangle with her legs and bill; and the mixture of black and white feathers pictures the gibbousness of the moon. We must not be surprised that the Egyptians delighted in slight resemblances; for the Greeks, too, in their pictures and statues of the gods, made use of many such images. For instance, in Crete there was a statue of Zeus without ears; for it is becoming that the ruler and lord of all things should listen to no one.[289] And Phidias placed a snake beside the statue of Athena and a tortoise beside the statue of Aphrodite[290] in Elis to show that maidens need a guard and that

[287] Cf. Cic. N. D. I. 36, 101.

[288] Cf. Apis as the image of the soul of Osiris, 359 B, 362 D, 368 C. On Egyptian worship of animals see Wellman Aegyp. in *Hermes*, 31, p. 226 foll., especially 234, 235. Parthey 261.

[289] Cf. de Is. 355 A, images of judges without hands; that is, justice could not be bribed. The chief judge with eyes closed; nor could justice be seduced by address.

[290] In conj. praec. 142 D, mention of same statue with same interpretation. See de an. proc. 1030 B, musical instruments in the hands of the statues of the gods show that harmony and order belong to divinity.

homekeeping and silence are becoming to wives. The trident of Poseidon is a symbol of the third place which the sea holds after the heavens and the air; for the same reason Amphitrite and the Tritons received those names. The Pythagoreans called numbers and geometrical forms by the names of the gods thus making use of symbolism. . . .

382 A. "If, therefore, the most noted philosophers did not see fit to neglect or disregard an enigma of the divine when they observed it even in soulless and bodiless things, still more do I think we ought to rejoice to see divine traits in natures that have sensation and life and feeling and moral character, not doing honor to these animals themselves but through them to the divine; looking upon them as clearer mirrors and as immediate creations of nature, instruments as it were or skillful devices of the god that orders all things. . . . Therefore it is not worse to find an image of the divine in living creatures than in works of bronze and stone. . . . My last explanations of the worship of animals I approve more than the others."

382 C-E. Metaphysical again.

"The sacred vestments of Isis are many-colored, for she is the principle of matter that produces and receives all things, light and darkness, day and night, fire and water, life and death, beginning and end. But the garment of Osiris has no shadow nor variety of color but is simple, like light; for the original principle and the intelligible is unmixed. Therefore they put these garments on but once and then keep them hidden, but they use the vestments of Isis often, for what is perceptible to the senses is in use and is subject to sight and touch and to changes sometimes into one form and sometimes into another; while the knowledge of the intelligible, which is pure and simple, lights up the soul but once as by a flash of lightning."[291]

The contrast between the same and the other is allegorically taught not only for ultimate philosophical elements of thought, but also for cosmogonical development. The worship of both Apollo and Dionysus at Delphi shows the two periods in the existence of the world. Apollo stands for the ecpyrosis, when the world is reduced to the pure element of fire, one (Apollo) and bright (Phoebus). Dionysus stands for the parti-colored world as we know it; and the stories of his dismemberment symbolize the division of the

[291] Cf. 352 B, C, the dress of the dead priests of Isis a symbol of true reason. 352 D-F, priests smooth shaven to show purity and simplicity; for the same reason woolen garments avoided, they are made of the hair of beasts and hair is an excrescence. Linen garments were worn by the priests: the true cause of all these customs is one, for Plato [Phaedo 67 B] says that it is not right to touch what is pure with the impure. This dress had physical symbolism also; flax is the product of the immortal earth, and the producer of an edible fruit. And it had another reason, it was useful, for it was suitable to all seasons and was especially healthful. Thus many causes may operate to produce a single custom.

one element into many elements and forms of bodies. The rites in his honor represent a world full of passion and change. Those in Apollo's honor are quiet and orderly. The statues of Apollo are of a man always young, those of Dionysus appear in many forms. The length of time that the paean is sung to Apollo is longer than that in which the dithyramb is sung to Dionysus, to show that the two periods are unequal.[292]

382 E. Osiris lord of Hades.

"The priests of the present day darkly and cautiously hint that this god rules over the dead and is identical with the Greek Hades and Pluto. This idea is misunderstood, and it causes the untrained multitude much uneasiness to think that the sacred and holy Osiris really lives under the earth, where the bodies of the dead are laid away. But he is himself far removed from the earth and is untouched by any substance that is subject to decay and death. In this life the souls of men, hemmed in by bodies and by passions, have no community with god, except as it were to touch upon an obscure dream with a consciousness trained by philosophy. But when souls have been released and pass into a state where they are invisible and pure and untouched by passion, this god is their leader and king; there they depend upon him and without satiety gaze upon and long for that beauty that cannot be described to men; it is this beauty that the ancient story showed Isis always loving and pursuing and dwelling with, so that she fills all things that share in generation with the beautiful and the good. Now these are the explanations most befitting the gods."[293]

With these characteristic words Plutarch closes his allegorical interpretation of the Isis myth.

He elsewhere gives a more rationalistic and less mystical interpretation of the stories of the after life. After death there is nothing left of the body to receive punishment, but those that have led an evil life have one retribution, *ἀδοξία καὶ ἄγνοια καὶ παντελῶς ἀφανισμός, ὃς ἀχρων εἰς τὸν ἀμειδῆ ποταμὸν ἀπὸ τῆς λήθης καταπυντίζει εἰς ἄβυσσον καὶ ἀχανὲς πέλαγος, ἀχρηστίαν καὶ ἀπραξίαν καὶ πᾶσαν ἄγνοιαν καὶ ἀδοξίαν συνεφελκόμενον.*[294]

There are some other scattered allegorical interpretations, as, Marsyas was punished because he contended by wordless music against words and melody, and it is words that appeal to reason.[295] Forgetfulness and the ferule are consecrated to Dionysus to show

[292] De E. 388 F-389 C, where Plutarch claims to be giving the teachings of the theologians both in verse and in prose.

[293] Observe "Platonic color."

[294] De lat. viv. 1130 D, E. Cf. non posse 1105 B, Cerberus and horrible punishments in Hades are only old wives' tales. Cf. 1093 A, B.

[295] Sym. 713 C, D.

that at friendly feasts errors should be forgotten or lightly reproved.[296] The third race was said to be descended from ash trees on account of its robustness.[297] That the priestesses of Hera and of Dionysus did not greet each other and that ivy was not allowed in the precinct of Hera were not admitted by Plutarch to be the result of mythical and nonsensical jealousies. But these religious restrictions showed that the marriage goddess and drunkenness could have nothing in common, as Plato[298] says. Also the ceremonies of the worship of Hera taught that husband and wife should be gentle to each other.[299] Gall was not used in sacrifice to Hera, goddess of marriage, to show that no bad temper should occur between man and wife.[300] The wineless sacrifices were to teach sobriety.[301] Homer knew, "as they say," that the shadow of the earth was pointed, for be called the night *θοήν*.[302] In Od. 4, 563 he meant that the end and boundary of the earth was where the shadow ceased.[303] The poets "mythologized" that night was born of the earth; the natural philosophers demonstrated that night was the shadow of the earth.[304] In the story of Hera and Leto the two names designated one thing. For Hera was the earth, and Leto the night, and the night is nothing but the shadow of the earth.[305] The quarrel of Zeus and Hera was a disturbance of the elements; if Zeus, the principle of heat, caused the dissension a drought came upon the earth; if Hera, the wet and windy force, a flood.[306] Some philosophers said in jest that Hephaestos was called lame because fire did not burn without fuel, nor could a lame man walk without a stick.[307] Many answers to the Roman questions give symbolic explanations: 1, 2, 10, 11, 12, 13. 22, 25, 26, 29, 72, 75, 76, 97, 101, 102, 109, 110, 111, 112.

[296] Sym. 612 D.

[297] Com. in Hes. § 7, on Hes. O. D. 143.

[298] Laws 775 C.

[299] Fr. de daed. Plat. § 2.

[300] Conj. praec. 141 F; observe the words *αἰνιττομένου τοῦ νομοθέτου*. The same explanation of this custom in fr. de daed. Plat. Sec. 2.

[301] De Is. 353 B. Cf. 354 A. the priests refrained from swine as a sign of luxury; 353 D, E, sea fish for the same reason, and also because of the corrupt nature of the sea; 352 F, they avoid pulse, mutton, pork, because they produce fat, and the priests abhor excess; salt, because it whets the appetite; 353 A, they do not allow Apis to drink of the Nile on the ground that it is fattening, and they wish to preserve in themselves and in Apis the divine spirit not weighed down by the mortal part; 353 F, onions avoided because they grow in the dark of the moon, also because they produce thirst and make the eyes water; Cf. Aulus Gel. 20, 8, for the same idea, quoted from Plut. com. in Hes. Bk. IV.

[302] De fac. lun. 923 B.

[303] Ib. 942 F.

[304] De prim. frig. 953 A.

[305] Fr. de daed. Plat. §4.

[306] Ib. §7.

[307] De fac. lun. 922 B. Cf. Heraclitus Alleg. Hom. c. 26.

APPENDIX I.—NUMBERS.

Immediately after the examples of Greek symbolism in statues, Plutarch went on to say that the Pythagoreans called numbers and geometrical forms by the names of the gods.[308] It can be inferred from this juxtaposition that he considered this nomenclature as symbolical merely. In this same essay the right-angled triangle of sides equal to three, four and five is used, with explicit reference to Plato,[309] as a symbol of Osiris, father or spirit; Isis, the material or matrix; Horus, the sensible world. How good a symbol of the world five is, he proved by the fact that πάντα is a paronym of πέντε and to count is called πεμπάσασθαι.[310] The symbolical use of geometrical figures appeared again when he said that Xenocrates made the equilateral triangle suggestive (ἀπεικάσας) of the divine nature, the scalene of the mortal, the isosceles of the demonic. This is stamped with Plutarch's approval by the addition of the characteristic idea that nature has put forth sensible images and visible likeneses of the gods; the sun, etc.[311]

In these passages Plutarch evidently uses numbers and figures as symbols and it is at least probable that they never had for him any mystic power. It is true that he studied mathematics assiduously, as we learn both from his own words[312] and from the long discussions in de E. c. 7-16, de def. or. c. 22-27, and de an. proc. c. 10-20. 29-32, but at the close of each discussion there is a hint to guide us in our judgment of his real attitude. After arguing for the interpretation of the consecrated E as the number five,[313] he concludes, "As I remember it, this was the conclusion of the arithmetical and mathematical encomiums of the E." The word encomiums would perhaps suggest that he was none too serious in putting forward the claims of five. A stronger argument against the five

[308] De Is. 381 F.

[309] Rep. 546. On this passage in the Rep. see Zeller II. 857. f. n. 1.

[310] De Is. 373 F-374 A. Cf. de E. 388 C. For πέντε as πάντα de def. or. 429 D. For πεμπάσασθαι de def. or. 429 D. and de E. 387 F.

[311] De def. or. 416 D. Cf. what has been said above p. 33 foll., 38 of the correspondence between the spiritual and physical realms.

[312] De E. 387 F. In de Is. he often gives explanations of the days upon which certain rites are performed by a reference to astronomy, especially by a reference to the phases and movements of the moon. The myth itself might be a representation of the eclipses, 368 D.

[313] Ferd. Schultz, Die Sprueche der Delp. Saeule, *Philologus* 24, p. 214, denies that the E can represent five, for the ancients used π for five.

may be drawn from the reply of Ammonius, that he would not discourage young men from mathematical pursuits, but that every number had much that could be praised for those who wish to praise it. Then he gave the true meaning of the E; it was εἶ, thou art, addressed to the divinity by the approaching worshipper. The interpretation as five received no more consideration at the close than any of the other suggestions, namely, that it was dedicated to the Pythian god because it is the second vowel, and the sun, over which Apollo presides, is the second planet; or it is the εἰ of questions and wishes; or the εἰ of the Stoic form of the syllogism.

At the end of chapter 37 of de def. or. after a long discussion of the number of worlds, in which much was again made of five, the conclusion is that one could not be positive in such a matter. So, too, near the close of the mathematical discussions in de an. proc. he disclaimed any desire to go into such matters with great particularity, 1028 A, and in the last chapter of this treatise he explicitly refused to sanction the Pythagorean doctrine that all things are like number, and explains definitely how he has been using numbers and figures and musical intervals, and how he understands Plato to use them in the Timaeus in his account of the creation of the world. "The demiurgus found the soul in disorder, and reduced it to harmony; the office of the proportions and numbers that the demiurgus used was but the harmony of the soul and its concord with itself; again, the soul used this harmony to rule terrestrial affairs." Even here, we see that numbers are only symbolical.[314]

[314] Cf. Zeller III, 173, Indessen greifen auch diese Betrachtungen [of numbers] in seiner Weltansicht nicht tiefer ein, da er doch immer am liebsten einfach auf die Wirkung der Gottheit zurückgeht, welche die Materie geordnet und gestaltet habe.

APPENDIX II.—THE ISIS MYTH.

Osiris, Isis, and Typhon were the children of Rhea. To Osiris and Isis was born Horus, like themselves orderly and beneficent. Osiris first ruled over the Egyptians and taught them the arts of civilized life, and gave them laws and the worship of the gods. Later, he went to all the countries of the earth, and induced many men to give up their savage life, and softened their harsh natures by eloquence and song and the finer arts. While he was gone Typhon was unable to raise a revolt against him, so well did Isis watch over the kingdom. But on his return he was overcome by stratagem. Typhon made a beautiful box to fit exactly the body of Osiris, which he had secretly measured, and invited Osiris and the conspirators to a feast. There he said jestingly that the box should belong to him whom it fitted. All tried it, and when Osiris had lain down in it the others rushed upon him and fastened the lid down with nails and molten lead. Then the box was thrown into the Nile, and so was washed out into the sea. Isis wandered long and sought the body of Osiris. At last she found it, and hid it in a marsh. Typhon was hunting there, and came upon the body. He tore it asunder and scattered the parts. Again Isis went out to search for the body, and to give burial to the scattered parts as she found them. Later, when Horus had been trained by Osiris, who came from Hades for that purpose, he conquered Typhon, and handed him over, bound, to his mother. However, she did not destroy him, but let him go.[215] Many details have been omitted.

Compare M. Wellman, Aegyptisches, *Hermes* 31, 221 foll., for translation of the myth and comment. According to Wellman, the myth as given by Plutarch was probably composed by Manetho, for the purpose of uniting the Egyptian and Greek religions. Parthey ed. de Is. p. i (cf. p. 81) refers to Bunsen's suspicion (Aeg. I. p. 95, 96), that Manetho was Plutarch's chief source, but adds that, however that may be, Plutarch looked at everything Egyptian in the light of his own time. But, p. 251, Plutarch composed what he has transmitted to us out of various myths, as shown by his calling Osiris the sun in one place, while in another he called him the offspring of the sun. Cf. p. X., Nebelhafte Verwirrung und schillernder Wechsel der Gestalten das wahre Element aller Mythologie sei, etc.

[215] De Is. 355 D foll.

P. 252, on the explanation of three Egyptian names, "Plutarch often used very good sources." Lafaye, Les divinités d'Alex. hors de l'Égypte, 5-23, syncretism of Greek and Egyptian religions from Herodotus to Plutarch. Pp. 5 and 19, monotheistic tendencies of Egyptian religion; see particularly 12, Il était impossible que la croyance au monothéisme et à l'immortalité de l'âme, qui se cachait au fond de la théologie égyptienne, ne seduisît pas en Grèce tous les esprits distingués que lassait le fardeau à la fois pesant et vide du polythéisme. P. 70, C'était la philosophie qui avait présidé à la fusion des mystères grecs et égyptiens; dès le jour ou les Ptolémés, et avec eux une légion d'écrivains, s'étaient appliqués à l'étude des traditions sacrées de la race vaincue, ils avaient taché d'en saisir le fil et l'esprit; de nombreux systèmes avaient été proposés. Plutarque les passe en revue et les résume; mais il voudrait aussi arriver à une synthèse, dire le dernier mot. The view of Lafaye is given in some fullness as a probable conjecture of what happened; on account of the loss of the writers preceding Plutarch it is impossible to determine what he owed to others and especially to whom he owed any particular explanation. Compare Gruppe, I, 439. But these explanations must not be considered as pure Hellenisms foisted upon a simple Egyptian myth; the monotheistic tendency of Egyptian theology has already been noted, and that is, of course, an unliteral interpretation of the popular stories and rites. Erman, Life in Ancient Egypt (trans. by Tirard) 344 foll., in the New Empire and even in the Middle Empire, hidden meanings were read into religious hymns—though none of those that Erman gives are allegorical. Sayce, Herod. App. 1. 343, "Set or Typhon, primarily the night, into whose character and attributes a moral meaning was gradually read, so that in the time of the New Empire he became the representative of evil, the enemy of the bright powers of light and goodness, the prince of the powers of darkness." It is impossible to give a scientific account of Egyptian religion at the time of the Ptolemies, for the documents have not been collected and sifted.[816]

With respect to Plutarch's attempts to explain hieroglyphics and Egyptian names it may be said in general, that it is not improbable that even the most figurative explanations were made to Plutarch, or to his sources, by the Egyptian priests themselves; also certain usages may have been temporary and local. When Plutarch, de Is. 354 F, says that hieroglyphics are symbolic, he is partly right; they are both phonetic and pictographic, but not exactly symbolic in Plutarch's sense. His statement, 362 D, that Egyptian names are significant is as true of that language as it would be of Greek; that

[816] Professor Breasted of the University of Chicago allows me to give him as my authority for this statement. (Cf. Erman 259, and 264, f. n. 3.) He kindly gave me the information in the next paragraphs also, on hieroglyphics and etymologies.

is, the etymology of some names can be made out. This was the view of Egyptian priests.

HIEROGLYPHICS.

354 F, cf. 371 E, eye and scepter the hieroglyphs of Osiris: eye and throne, not scepter; not with the figurative meanings given by Plutarch, though doubtless the priests were responsible for these explanations.

363 F, fish the hieroglyph for hate: it was used as symbol of hateful things.

365 B, a leaf (of the fig?) the hieroglyph of king and of the south; not a leaf, but a plant was used for the southern land, and later for the king of southern Egypt.

371 E, hawk hieroglyph of Osiris: hawk a symbol of a god, Edfu; found as far back as First Dynasty. Symbolism not known.

EGYPTIAN ETYMOLOGIES.

354 D, Amun is what is concealed: a similar root does mean to conceal.

355 A, Osiris is the many-eyed: right. Cf. Parthey, 186.

359 B, Memphis is the haven of good things: it does mean good rest.

365 E, ivy was called chenosiris, tree of Osiris: right. Cf. V. Loret, La Flore Pharaonique p. 69.

365 F, Osiris means strong: a pun, strong equals ws r, Osiris equals ws yr.

368 B, Omphis means benefactor: probably right.

374 B, Muth (name of Isis), mother: right.

374 B, Athyri (name of Isis), house of Horus: right, for Athyri is Hathor, the goddess of heaven, and Horus is the sun, which dwells in the heavens.

The following authors Plutarch quotes on Egyptian religion or subjects connected with religious rites or beliefs. Of some only fragments are extant; of others nothing remains. See Wyttenbach in his notes on the passages, and Christ under the various names, though neither comments upon all these writers.

Aristagoras, de Is. 352 F.

Hecataeus, 353 B; of Abdera 354 D. Fragments in Mueller F. H. G II. 384-396.

Eudoxus, in the second book of the περίοδος 353 C; 359 C; 363 A; 372 E; 376 C; 377 A. See Christ 570, who says that the fragments are collected by Brandes, Ueber d. Zeitalter d. Astron. Geminos u. d. Geog. Eudoxos in Jahns Arch. 13 Bd. (1847) S. 199-230.

Manetho, the Sebennite 354 D; the Sebennite, 362 A; 371 C; 376 B; 380 D. Mueller F H G II. 511-616.

Archemachus of Euboea, 361 F.

Heraclides Ponticus, 361 F. Mueller F. H. G. II. 197-207.

Timotheus the exegete, 362 A.

Phylarchus, 362 B. Wyttenbach gives the Ms. reading Philarchus and supposes that Plutarch meant a different person from the Phylarchus he quotes elsewhere.

Dinon, 363 C.

Castor, 363 C. Fragments are collected by Mueller in the Didot edition of Herodotus, p. 153 foll.

Hellanicus, 364 D.

Ariston who wrote about Athenian colonies quotes Alexarchus, 365 E. Fragments of one Ariston Mueller F H G III. 324. 5.

Hermaeus, in the first letter on the Egyptians 365 F; 368 B.

Mnaseas, 365 F.

Anticlides, 365 F.

JUL 12
JUN 29